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Abstract
The current structures and draft structures grant the party leaders and the Executive
undue power over the Parliament in two ways. First, by virtue of constitutional design, the
Executive and the party leader’s hegemony reduce the Parliament’s capacity to act as a check on
the Executive. Second, there are contextual factors correlated with political will in using
available accountability mechanisms which locate beyond the design factors and they have nexus
with effectiveness of the Parliament. In the other words, the contextual factor such as electoral
system, party discipline, and party formations impact on the will of the parliament in holding the
executive accountable. Moreover, despite the existence of some mechanisms to hold the
government accountable, political accountability is eroding.
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Introduction:
The main argument of this thesis is that Parliament’s powers to hold government
accountable are reduced by design defects in both the draft constitution and the current
structures; that the parliament’s political will is mitigated by contextual factors; and that the PRSTV and “Constrained Parliamentary” models could effectively respond to mitigate defects in
order to allow the Parliament to actively check the executive.
This thesis is divided into three main chapters. The first chapter provides the general
background for the Kurdistan region, including historical chronologies of the creation of the
Kurdistan region’s territory, the institutionalizing political process, and the draft constitution.
The second chapter discusses the accountability concept and its relation to the form of
government and role of the parliament (legislative body). It also elaborates the design defects
under both draft constitution and current government structures in relation to political
accountability concept and its mechanisms. Further, it addresses contextual factors that
contribute for further exacerbating the power of parliament in holding government into account.
The third chapter propose a new constitutional design that could respond to the
accountability crises of the Kurdistan region. In this new design, the issues of the party
formations, monopoly of poltical power, party leaders are reduced by PR-STV because PR-STV
can allow various forms of incentives for party leaders and MPs that could empower the political
will of parliament in exercising its available tools of accoutablity. In addtion, the constrained
parlimantarism is helpful desgin in oversghting the executive’s because it incentivies the
poltical actors to discusse the political descions in the parliament’s main chamber in context of
KR.
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Chapter I:
This chapter provides the background about the formations of Kurdistan region and its
emerging territories, its institutionalizing political processes, its emerging political opposition,
and the drafting of the Kurdish constitution. This chapter provides insight into Kurdistan’s
current constitutional environment. Also, it elucidates the behavior of political actors in directing
government institutions and clarifies how the parliamentary majority has been used for
illegitimate ends through different historical phases.
1.1 The Emergence of the Kurdistan region’s territory as sovereign legal entity:
This section briefly analyzes the emergence of the Kurdistan region as a recognized
region inside Iraq through different historical stages. This section chronologically addresses
each historical stage of the Kurdistan region inside Iraq when there are revolutionary movements
demanding the autonomous region or the self-governing territory to include the governorate of
Kirkuk, Khanaqin, Sulimanyah, Duhok, and Erbil. Hence, this section does not deal with the
broader definition of the Greater Kurdistan, which claimed full independence during 1918-1943.
Also, this section does not discuss all revolutionary movements after 1943, but only those
revolutions that were able to compel the Iraqi government to generate legal guarantees with
respect to the Kurdish territory.
During the Iraqi monarchy, Kurdish dissent enabled large-scale control of the Kurdish
territories in 1944.1 The uprising obliged the Prime Minister to negotiate with the Kurdish
leadership. The Kurdish leadership demanded the autonomous region including Kirkuk,

1

SUZAN IBRAHIM HAJI AMEN, AL-TAJREBA DEMOQRTIA FI KURDISTAN AL-IRAQ [THE EXPERIENCE OF DEMOCRACY IN
IRAQI KURDISTAN], 26(2011) (AR.).
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Khanaqin, Sulimanyah, Duhok, and Erbil.2 This uprising is considered a clear intent of the Kurds
to establish autonomous territory within Iraq borders. The Kurdish leaderships also demanded
the power-sharing administrations with the Iraqi government by having a Kurdish deputy for
each minister, recognition of the Kurdish language as an official language of Iraq, and launching
economic reform in the Kurds’ area. All these conditions were part of the cease-fire agreement.3
After these negotiations, the Iraqi government concluded the cease-fire agreement with the
Kurdish leadership. They agreed that all areas, which are controlled by the Kurdish forces, shall
be managed under Kurdish administration. They also agreed to allow Kurds to have autonomy in
the field of the education and culture.4 Further, all weapons and military hardware, which were
seized by Kurds, were to remain in Kurds’ possession.5 In 1945, the Iraqi government
nevertheless began seizing political activists and initiated military campaigns towards the
Kurdish leadership's headquarter. Thus, these actions ignited hostilities between Kurdish forces
and Iraqi army.6 The Iraqi government, by virtue of its actions, revoked the cease-fire agreement
and its promises.7
In 1970, the Kurdish leadership reached a peace agreement with the Iraqi government and
its representing Ba’ath party.8 This peace agreement, titled the “March 11 Manifesto” of 1970, 9
established the self-governing areas for the Kurds in the north of Iraq.10 Both the central
government and the Kurdish leadership agreed that the boundaries of the self-governing areas

2

Id at 27.
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id at 27-28.
7
Id.
8
Peter Malanczuk, The Kurdish Crisis and Allied Intervention in the Aftermath of the Second Gulf War, 2 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 114, 116-117(1991).
9
Sherko Kirmanj, Kurdistan Region: A Country Profile, 9 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 145, 147(2013).
10
Malanczuk, supra note 8, at 116.
3
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should be based on the result of the census.11 However, the central government, soon after
ratifying the peace agreement, initiated Arabization campaign against the Kurdish areas by
banishing the Kurdish settlers and substituting them with Arab settlers.12
On March 11, 1974, the Iraqi central government, which was represented by the
revolutionary command council and controlled by the Ba’ath party, 13 unilaterally transformed
this peace agreement into two legal documents. The Ba’ath party implemented this
transformation in primarily two ways. First, the revolutionary command council amended the
interim Constitution of 1970 by stipulating that the majority Kurdish-populated areas “shall
enjoy autonomy in accordance with what is defined by the law.” 14 Second, it enacted the
autonomy law of 1974 on the same day.15 The validity of these substantive and procedural
changes to the Kurdish autonomy law were questionable.
In term of the substance, the autonomy law insisted on self-governing areas for the
Kurds, but the autonomy law authorized a very limited independence for the councils of the
Kurdish self-governing areas. 16 For instance, the autonomy law enabled the Kurds to elect a
legislative council in the Kurdish- populated areas,17 but the President of Iraq had the

11

Kirmanj, supra note 9, at 147.
Id.
13
See Article 37, Al-Doustour al-Iraqi al-Mouakkat [The Interim Iraqi Constitution] of 1970 (“ The Revolutionary
Command Council is the supreme institution in the State, which on 17 July 1968, assumed the responsibility to
realize the public will of the people, by removing the authority from the reactionary, individual, and corruptive
regime, and returning it to the people.”).
14
See Resolution Amendment 247, Al-Doustour al-Iraqi al-Mouakkat [The Interim Iraqi Constitution] of 1970.( “In
accordance with the provisions of paragraph B, Article 63 of the Interim Constitution, The Revolutionary Command
Council have decided, in the Name of the People, in its session convened on 11 March, 1974, to amend the Interim
Constitution promulgated on 16 July, 1970 as follows :Article 1: The following paragraph shall be added to Article 8, section C: The region, whose majority of population
is from Kurds, shall enjoy Autonomy in accordance with what is defined by the Law.”).
15
Id.
16
Natasha Carver, Is Iraq/Kurdistan a State such that it can be Said to Operate State Systems and thereby Offer
Protection to its ‘Citizens’?, 14 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF REFUGEE LAW 57, 66(2002).
17
Article 10, Law of Autonomy No.33 of 1974 (Iraq) (“The Legislative Council is the legislative body elected in the
Region; its formation, organization and procedure shall be defined by a Law.”).
12
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discretionary power to appoint a president of the Executive Council—who would be empowered
to enforce the ordinance of the Legislative Council.18 Additionally, the President of Iraq could
dissolve the executive council of the Kurdish self-governing areas.19 Further, the Legislative
Local Council was confined to issuing ordinances and was prohibited from passing any statute.20
In addition to the Legislative Council’s limited capacity, its ordinances could be reviewed by the
judicial branch of the central government.21 The president of Iraq had the right to dissolve the
Legislative Council, which was elected by Kurdish voters, if the legislative council dissented to
the judicial review by the central government.22 The content of this law furnished intentional
legal gaps, creating a political structure in favor of the Ba’ath regime. As a result, the final
decisions of those councils and their competencies were ultimately controlled by the central
government.
In procedural terms, the autonomy law did not afford public participation for the Kurdish
voters because the Iraqi government unilaterally enacted law without affording Kurdish review
or discussion of those laws. However, the Ba’ath regime did permit Kurdish leadership to either
accept the law or to refuse it within fifteen days of each law’s promulgation.23

Article 13, Section C, Law of Autonomy No.33 of 1974(Iraq) (“The President of the Republic entrusts one of the
members of the Legislative Council to preside over and formulate the Executive Council.”).
19
Article 13, Section F, Law of Autonomy No.33 of 1974(Iraq) ( “ The President of the Republic is entitled to
release the President of the Executive Council from his post, and in this case the Council shall be deemed as
dissolved.”).
20
Article 12, Section A, Law of Autonomy No.33 of 1974(Iraq) (“ Adopt legislative resolutions necessary for
developing the Region and promoting its social, cultural, reconstructional and economic utilities of the local nature
within the limits of the general policy of the State.”).
21
Article 12, Section B, Law of Autonomy No.33 of 1974(Iraq) (“The Minister of Justice, or the Minister of State, is
entitled to discredit the re- solutions of the Autonomy's Bodies before the Observation Body cited in the previous
paragraph, for their contradiction to the Constitution or laws or regulations within thirty days as from the date of
notifying the Minister of State.”).
22
Article 20, Section A, Law of Autonomy No.33 of 1974(Iraq) (“The President of the Republic is entitled to
dissolve the Legislative Council …. [I]n case of its non-abiding by the decisions of the Observation Body stipulated
in Article (19) of this Law.”).
23
Sarah E Whitesell, The Kurdish Crisis: An International Incident Study, 21 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 455,460
(1992).
18
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Moreover, the outcome of the autonomy law revealed that Iraqi government tried to buy
time to consolidate its power over the Kurdish revolution. The Iraqi government’s actions were
considered more of a tactical policy that did not truly recognize the Kurdish autonomy inside
Iraq.24 For instance, in drawing boundaries of the Kurdistan self-governing areas, the Iraqi
government deprived the Kurds from their oil-rich territories including Khanaqin and Kirkuk in
addition to some strategic areas such as Akra and Sinjar.25 As a result of all these deprivations,
the Kurdish leadership refused the autonomy law of 1974.26 The peace agreement was revoked,
and the revolution started again.27
Since February of 1991, the Kurdish territories have received international protection
mandates. During the Gulf war, President George H.W Bush exhorted the Iraqi people to
overthrow their oppressors and to rebel against Saddam Hussein's regime. The United States,
however, did not intervene in Baghdad by sending troops to topple Hussein’s regime.28 At the
same time, the Shiite population began an uprising in the south of Iraq and the Kurds revolted in
north of Iraq. Hence, Hussein’s regime seized the opportunity that US did not send troops and
rearranged its army and suppressed both Shiites in the south and Kurds in the north. In
suppressing the north, the Iraqi army committed atrocities, pushing Kurds to flee to the borders
of Iran and Turkey. Turkey did not allow Kurd refugees to enter its border, but Iran allowed
Kurds to settle in refugee camps inside Iran’s territories. 29

24

Ofra Bengio, Autonomy in Kurdistan in historical Perspective, In THE FUTURE OF KURDISTAN IN IRAQ 173, 175
(Brendan O'Leary et al.,eds., 2006).
25
Alexander Dawoody, The Kurdish quest for autonomy and Iraq's statehood, 41 JOURNAL OF ASIAN AND AFRICAN
STUDIES 483, 487(2006); see aslo Kirmanj, supra note 9, at 147.
26
Whitesell, supra note 23, at 461.
27
Id at 461-462.
28
Philip S. Hadji, The Case for Kurdish Statehood in Iraq, 41 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 513, 519(2009).
29
Id at 519-520.
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Hussein’s atrocities against the Kurds pushed the UN Security Council to demand
stopping repression of Kurds and other civilians in resolution 688, which stated, “a massive flow
of refugees towards and across international frontiers . . . threaten[s] international peace and
security."30 The language of the resolution demanded the international community to act in
stopping the repression of Kurds in the north and Shiites in the south.31 In responding to
resolution 688, the United States, with its allies (Britain and France), imposed a no-fly zone over
the north from 36th parallel to north Iraq and 32nd parallel to south Iraq.32
Furhter, the no-fly zone was legally justified through the resolution 686 and 687 because
they addressed the issue of ceasing fire by stipulating that Iraqi government should " [c]ease
hostile or provocative actions by its forces against all Member States, including missile attacks
and flights of combat aircraft."33 Implicitly, the language of cease-fire agreement of Resolution
686 held that as long as the US and its allies flew over the Iraq airspace, the Iraqi combat aircraft
could not enter the area between the 36th and 32nd paralells. Also, the Resolution permitted the
U.S. and its allies to fly over the zones to protect civilians and ensure that the Iraqi government
was acting within its provision to stop hostility.34After the U.S. and its allies instituted the no-fly
zone for the Kurds, the Iraqi government withdrew from most Kurdish areas in the north of
Iraq.35 Henceforth, the Iraqi government unilaterally defined the Kurdistan region boundaries by
its withdrawing, and began demarcating the boundaries with its military checkpoints to include

Timothy P Mcilmail, No – Fly Zones : The Imposition and Enforcement of Air Exclusion Regimes Over Bosnia
and Iraq, 17 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 35, 40-50 (1994).
31
Id.
32
Id at 52.
33
Id at 53.
34
Id.
35
IMAD M MIRZA, DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTHERN KURDISTAN: AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE PROSPECTS FOR
DEMOCRACY 18 (2007).
30
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three governorates (Sulimanyah, Duhok, and Erbil) as it was defined in the autonomy law of
1970.36
After the invasion of Iraq, Kurds actively participated in the process of rebuilding Iraq.
They were able to transform the Kurdistan region boundaries from the de-facto territory, which
is unilaterally demarcated by Iraqi regime, to be fully recognized legal territory through
(Transitional Administrative Law). 37 TAL explicitly recognized the Kurdistan region borders,
stating “[t]he Kurdistan Regional Government is recognized as the official government of the
territories that were administered by that government on 19 March 2003 in the governorates of
Dohuk, Erbil, Sulimanyah, Kirkuk, Diyala and Nineveh. TAL also stated, “[t]he term ‘Kurdistan
Regional Government’ shall refer to the Kurdistan National Assembly, the Kurdistan Council of
Ministers, and the regional judicial authority in the Kurdistan region.”38 Furthermore, TAL
recognized the demographic changing of these areas by Hussein’s Regime.39 Consequently, TAL
provided a mechanism for resolving these disputed areas, which ultimately could be the parts of

36

CHARLES G MACDONALD & CAROLE A O'LEARY, KURDISH IDENTITY: HUMAN RIGHTS AND POLITICAL STATUS,
150 (2007)
37
Kenneth Katzman, Kurds in Post-Saddam Iraq, 2-3 (DIANE Publishing. 2010).
38
See Article 53, Section A, Transitional Administrative law (2004).
39
See Article 58, Section A, Transitional Administrative law (2004) (“The Iraqi Transitional Government, and
especially the Iraqi Property Claims Commission and other relevant bodies, shall act expeditiously to take measures
to remedy the injustice caused by the previous regime’s practices in altering the demographic character of certain
regions, including Kirkuk, by deporting and expelling individuals from their places of residence, forcing migration
in and out of the region, settling individuals alien to the region, depriving the inhabitants of work, and correcting
nationality. To remedy this injustice, the Iraqi Transitional Government shall take the following steps [.]”).
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the legal boundaries of Kurdistan region.40 Today, the Kirkuk and Khanaqin remain disputed
territories between the Iraq government and the Kurdistan region.41
Moreover, the Kurdistan region, in the permanent Iraqi constitution of 2005, is
acknowledged as a legal and federal region within Iraq border. The Iraqi Constitution stated,
“[t]his Constitution, upon coming into force, shall recognize the region of Kurdistan, along with
its existing authorities, as a federal region.” Further, the 2005 Constitution recognized all current
boundaries and territories of the Kurdistan region. Nonetheless, Kurdistan’s territories remain in
dispute. The permanent Constitution of Iraq, by Article 140, preserved recognition of Kirkuk and
other disputed areas as demographic changed territories by implicating article 58 of TAL.42
Additionally, Article 140 provides mechanisms for resolving these territories by stipulating
normalization, census, and eventually referendum in these disputed areas.43 The Constitution
called for these mechanisms to be implemented by December 31, 2007.44
In addition, the dilemma of these disputed areas has reflected on the draft of the
Kurdistan region constitution. The Kurdistan region border even has been identified as two kinds

See Article 58, Section B, Transitional Administrative law (2004) (“The previous regime also manipulated and
changed administrative boundaries for political ends. The Presidency Council of the Iraqi Transitional Government
shall make recommendations to the National Assembly on remedying these unjust changes in the permanent
constitution. In the event the Presidency Council is unable to agree unanimously on a set of recommendations, it
shall unanimously appoint a neutral arbitrator to examine the issue and make recommendations. In the event the
Presidency Council is unable to agree on an arbitrator, it shall request the Secretary General of the United Nations to
appoint a distinguished international person to be the arbitrator.”).
41
See Article 58, Section C, Transitional Administrative law (2004) (“The permanent resolution of disputed
territories, including Kirkuk, shall be deferred until after these measures are completed, a fair and transparent census
has been conducted and the permanent constitution has been ratified This resolution shall be consistent with the
principle of justice, taking into account the will of the people of those territories.”).
42
Article 140, Doustour Joumhouriat al-Iraq [The Constitution of the Republic of Iraq] of 2005. (“First: The
executive authority shall undertake the necessary steps to complete the implementation of the requirements of all
subparagraphs of Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative Law. Second: The- responsibility placed upon the
executive branch of the Iraqi Transitional Government stipulated in Article 58 of the Transitional Administrative
Law shall extend and continue to the executive authority elected in accordance with this Constitution, provided that
it accomplishes completely ‘normalization and census and concludes with a referendum in Kirkuk and other
disputed territories to determine the will of their citizens’, by a date not to exceed the 31st of December 2007.”).
43
Id.
44
Kirmanj, supra note 9, at 152.
40
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of border. One is the recognized territories under framework of Iraqi Constitution. This kind of
border can be called the “territorial borders.” The territorial borders are described in the drafted
Kurdish Constitution as “[t]he Iraqi Kurdistan Region is a geographical historical entity
consisting of Dohuk governorate with its existing administrative borders, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniyah,
Erbil, and districts of 'Aqrah, Shaikhan, Sinjar, Talkaif, Qaraqush, and townships of Zamar,
Ba'asheeqa, and Aski Kalak from Nineveh province, districts of Khanaqin and Mandali from
Diyala province with its administrative border before 1968.”45 Further, the Iraqi Constitution
does not specify the “territorial borders” of the Kurdistan region. This lack of specification
implicitly grants the Kurdistan regional government authority to determine its territorial border
according to KRG’s demarcation.
The second kind of Kurdistan region’s border is called “political border.” The meaning of
the political border implicates the disputed areas of article 140 of Iraqi constitution. The DCKR
stated “[t]he political borders of the Region shall be determined by the implementation of Article
140 of the Federal Constitution.”46 The main purpose behind the idea of the political borders is
that if the Kurdistan region confines itself to actually recognized borders under the Iraqi
constitution, this confining may imply that the Kurdistan region concedes the disputed areas to
the federal government of Iraq because these areas are not be mentioned as Kurdistan region
borders. For this reason, DCKR intends to preserve its prerogative by creating the political
borders ideas.

45
46

Article 2, Section 1, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 2009.
Article 2, Section 2, Rashnusi Doustouri Haremi Kurdistan [The Draft Constitution of Kurdistan Region] of 2009.
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1.2 Emerging governmental institutions
This section focuses on the process of rebuilding government institutions. After the Iraqi
government had withdrawn its institutions from the No-fly zone, which later was recognized as
the Kurdistan region, in October1991, 47 Kurdistan faced an administration vacuum.48 The size
of this vacuum negatively impacted the economic infrastructure of the Kurdistan region. For
instance, withdrawing of Iraqi government institutions caused 300,000 civil servants to be out of
work.49 Among the Kurdish region’s population, unemployment was between 70%-90%.50 In
addition, the Iraqi regime also set the economic blockade on the Kurdistan region despite the fact
that Iraq itself was under UN trade sanctions. The Kurds lost the 75% of their supplies that came
from the other parts of Iraq.51 The sanction policy was aimed at creating chaos and starvation in
the Kurdistan region.52 Hence, this chaos and starvation could induce the Kurdish leadership to
demand the Iraqi government to take control of the no-fly zone and ultimately to provide relief to
the Kurds. 53
However, he Kurdish political parties reorganized themselves in one front, which was
called the Iraqi Kurdistan Front (IKF).54 The Kurdish political parties were aware of the
administration vacuum and began self-governing to deliver basic needs for the citizens. Hence,
the IKF, with advice from a committee of Judges and lawyers, drafted and ratified the first law,

47

Kirmanj, supra note 9, at 148.
Id.
49
Id at 154.
50
Id.
51
HANS EIVIND DALSBØ, A CULTURE FOR DEMOCRACY? EMERGENT CIVIL SOCIETY AND CULTURE IN SOUTHERN
KURDISTAN 39 (2007).
52
Id.
53
Mirza, supra note 35, at 18.
54
Michael M Gunter, The KDP-PUK conflict in northern Iraq, 50 THE MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL 224, 226 (1996)
(IKF was established in 1988. The main purpose of IKF was to overthrow the Ba’ath regime in the power and to
seek for creating democratic regime in the Iraq and to establish the Iraqi Kurdistan as federal state in inside Iraq).
48
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which established the first Kurdistan National Assembly (KNA).55 Henceforth, all other
branches of governments were created by the KNA. Indeed, the Kurdish region has no
constitution. Instead, the IKF through seven political leaders enacted the first law to establish the
Kurdistan National Assembly, 56 which, in 2009, was later renamed as the Kurdistan
Parliament.57 Also, the Kurdistan region voters have not voted for the Kurdistan National
Assembly Law, but instead the Kurdish voters have participated to vote for the political parties in
the election process.
Despite of the aforementioned facts, the Kurdistan National Assembly Law (KNAL) is
the fundamental law that organizes political and governmental structures because KNAL, to
some degree, furnishes the self-government system in the No-fly zone; and regulates the
governmental vacuum. 58 The KNAL regulated the National Assembly’s first election in May
1992.59 Even though the Kurdistan region did not have a formal census, IKF considered the
percentage of turnout was 90% of the 1.1 million eligible voters.60
The KNAL stipulated that the political parties and independent candidates must pass the
7% threshold to enter the national assembly. 61 Due to the threshold, numerous small parties and
independent candidates failed to gain seats in the National Assembly. The result of the threshold
was that the PUK won 44.93 % of the votes and KDP won 47.51 % votes.62 The result between

55

DENISE NATALI, KURDISH QUASI-STATE: DEVELOPMENT AND DEPENDENCY IN POST-GULF WAR IRAQ 33 (2010).
See Dalsbø, supra note 51, at 40 (There are some arguments that point out to the fact that Kurdish leaderships did
not want to show their steps as part of creating independent countries. Therefore, they chose to have national
assembly law instead of the constitutions in 1991.).
57
Article 1, Section 1, Fourth Amendment of the National Assembly (Law No.1 of 1992) No.4 of 2009.
58
Natali, supra note 55, at 33.
59
Michael M Gunter, supra note 54, at 226.
60
Dalsbø, supra note 51, at 40.
61
Id.
62
Id.
56
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KDP and PUK was very close, but none of them formed the required majority.63 The KDP
gained 51 seats, and PUK gained 49 seats. The election process had many issues with the validity
of votes and counting.
The PUK urged KDP to accept a shared government, threatening resolution by violence
otherwise., The PUK and KDP agreed to share the government, the national assembly, and the
judicial branch based on 50-50 split—half of governmental power to KDP and the other half for
PUK. For instance, if the Minster was PUK, the Deputy of Minster had to be KDP and so forth.
This “50-50” sharing was reflected even in the primary government levels such us schools,
hospitals, checkpoints, and police departments. 64Also, it is reflected in the law of the council of
minister. The law of the council of minister provides that if the ministers of one political party,
which formed the government with the other political party, resigned from the council, the
council of ministers would be considered dissolved.65
The first Iraqi Kurdistan government, which is called Kurdistan regional government
(KRG)66, formed based on power-sharing in July 1992.67 Power-sharing agreement, to some
degree, was a responsive solution for filling the governmental vacuum of Kurdistan region and
for keeping unity of Kurdistan from old enmities of PUK and KDP. Nevertheless, the power of
Kurdistan region’s institution was undermined by those officials who carried order from KDP
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and PUK’s politburo. For instance, Barzani and Talabani did not hold any governmental position
inside KRG, but they were substantial descion-maker to direct the agenda of the government.68
The power-sharing process created the partisanship government from a basic level of
government to a higher level of government.69 The KRG was constrained to propose the policy
or implanting program to PUK and KDP’s politburo. After approving by politburos, the KRG
could move forward to exercise its executive powers. Technically, the politburo played role of
both National Assembly and Council of Minister because the actual and efficient political
deliberation and discussion were taken place in politburos instead of the National Assembly or
Council of Ministries. KRG was a rubber stamp to fulfill the politburos’ orders. 70 Similarly,
dividing the council of ministries between PUK and KDP caused the creation of mutual veto
between the ministers and their deputies.71 In this way, the power of the minister was equal to the
power of his or her deputy. Consequently, executing governmental duties required approval by
both of them.72 Mutual veto generated heavy burdens of executing governmental tasks and its
efficiency.73
At the beginning of 1992, leadership was the major dispute between PUK and KDP
because both Talabani and Barzani highly contested to be the highest power in the hierarchy of
the executive. In order to be supreme leader and to have power over both the national assembly
and council of ministries, PUK and KDP passed the law to determine the supreme leader of
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national liberation movement in August 4, 1992.74 In the Theory, the supreme leader’s fixedmandate shifted the system from a parliamentary system to a semi-presidential system because
the president possessed the fixed-mandate with having substantial power, and the survival of
government depended on the parliament confidence.75 The supreme leader had both powers of
foreign affairs and defense intermingled with prime minister’s powers, and the broad legislative
powers intermingled with the national assembly powers.76 Consequently, the supreme leader
would represent the Kurdistan region at internal and international levels, exercising commander
in chief power, and having veto power on enactments of the national assembly.77 Also, the Prime
Minister was accountable to the supreme leader in fulfilling its duties.78 Notably, in the law of
electing supreme leader of liberation movement did not include any impeachment provision or
any safeguard against supreme leader’s power. Implicitly, the law immunized the supreme leader
from any checks by National Assembly or council of ministers. The election of the supreme
leader was conducted at the same time of the National Assembly election. Neither Barzani nor
Talabani was able to secure the majority of the voters.79 The supreme leader position was empty
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until 1999, when Talabani unilaterally declared himself as the supreme leader of liberation
movements.80
Arguably, the KRG’s structures lacked any checks and balances because the
governmental power was highly concentrated in the politburos since the decision-making process
was totally outside of the government bodies.81 Even the politburo does not have any
accountability for his members because the structures of these two political parties based on the
Stalinist political structure characterized by intense hierarchy systems.82 The KRG functioned
depending on the will of PUK and KDP. Hence, there were potentialities of the conflict of
interest between the politburos, which remained authoritative during two consecutive cabinets.
1.3 Civil War and the Period of Two Administration
By the end of 1993, the relation between PUK and KDP had deteriorated due to their
differences related to revenue sharing and balance of powers in the region. Moreover, the PUK
and KDP had significant problems co-managing government resources because these political
parties created their own revenue resources. These revenues were not deposited into the
government treasury. For instance, KDP gained 85 percent of its revenue from Kurdish-Turkish
border through tariff and taxation, which reached 750 million annually. Likewise, PUK
reestablished Sulimanyah cigarette factory, which produced from 12,000 to 144,000 packs a day
between 1991 to 1997.83 Even some officials of KRG transferred treasury money to the personal
accounts of politburos.84 These corrupt means of revenue collection created “accusation[s] and
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counter-accusation[s]” between both PUK and KDP.85 Each of them blamed the other side for
corruption by using public money for the personal benefit.86 Meanwhile, PUK and KDP had
worked to reinforce their territorial base by creating obstacles for the other.
The small parties, which could not pass the 7 percent threshold, joined the KDP and
some others joined the PUK.87 The Kurdistan Unity Party with three smaller parties concluded
an agreement with KDP to become part of KDP political structures. 88 This new formation of
KDP could change the balance of power inside the government. The KDP claimed that the 50-50
power sharing agreement should be rejected because KDP had more supporters than PUK.
KDP’s claim was the first signal to PUK that PUK could not be an equal partner to KDP for
purposes of power-sharing. This new coalition threatened the future of PUK and its stake in the
elections of 1995.89
All these factors ignited the civil war in April 1994. At the outset, PUK was able to
control both Sulimanyah and Erbil. However, the KDP was able to reverse this situation. In
1996, KDP, with the Iraqi army defeated PUK in Erbil. KDP controlled Dhok and Erbil, which
become the territory for KDP. It formed its cabinet of ministries because KDP, with five seats of
minorities, was able to fulfill the majority of Kurdistan National Assembly. The PUK and its
allies controlled Sulimanyah, which become the territory for the other cabinet of ministries under
PUK’s leadership. As result, the executive power was divided for two cabinets of ministries, one
in Erbil and the other one in Sulimanyah, but the judicial branch, especially the Court of
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Cassation, remained unified until 1999.90 Both the PUK and the KDP claimed to be the
legitimate and official government of Kurdistan region.91 The civil war continued from 1994 to
1998.92
After series of agreements, both Barzani and Talabani concluded a peace agreement to
furnish peace in the Kurdistan region on September 17, 1998. The Washington agreement, to
some degree, provided stability in the region.93 The Washington agreement stipulated that PUK
and KDP agreed to create a provisional government followed by the general election for KNA in
order to establish a unified government.94 The agreement further stipulated that KDP should
share its revenue with PUK.95 Finally, the agreement stipulated that both PUK and KDP should
cooperate with Turkey to stop the activity of PKK.96Nevertheless, KDP argued that the PUK was
helping PKK implicitly by allowing PKK to use PUK’s territory against KDP. 97 Likewise, PUK
argued that KDP was creating a pretext to undermine the Washington agreement because KDP
was not willing to share its revenue. The contesting for leadership was unresolved. Divisions
between the PUK and the KDP continued to run deep. In August 1999, the PUK unilaterally
declared Talabani as Supreme leader of Kurdish liberation movement. Additionally, PUK
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created a second Court of Cassation in Sulimanyah to review the judgment of the lower court.98
KDP formed its fourth cabinet of the government, including eighteen ministers and five ministers
of the region, without allowing PUK to participate. From 1994 to 2000, PUK and KDP had
concluded dozens of agreements, but these agreements were not implemented.99
1.4 Unification of government and emerging of the presidency position.
After 11 September 2001, the political scene began changing as both PUK and KDP had
anticipated the Saddam Hussein would be removed.100 They intended to capitalize on the
Peshmerga forces by showing that they would be essential allies to the US during the invasion of
Iraq analogous to the Northern Alliance of Afghanistan. PUK and KDP struggled to not be
marginalized after the invasion of Iraq. Especially, KDP had more predicaments post-Saddam
Hussein because KDP was controlling the oil route between Turkey and Baghdad. The regime
change impacted the revenue that KDP got from the Oil’s route.101Post Saddam, both the KDP
and PUK demanded a federal system for the Kurdistan region. To some degree, KDP wanted
more powerful federal region for post-Saddam area to maintain its economic interest in the
region.102The PUK, on the other hand, sought a softer version of federalism for the Kurdistan
region.103
Arguably, KDP and PUK noticed that the divided government would reduce their
bargaining power with the Iraqi government in the post-Saddam Hussein era. By the end of
2002, PUK's legislators agreed to participate in KNA session. This participation could be
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considered as the first step for unification of the government by activating the KNA as the one
legislature for the whole Kurdistan region.104 Furthermore, after the invasion of Iraq by United
States and its Allies, the political scene in Iraq was changing rapidly.
December 1, 2004, Talabani and Barzani concluded a power-sharing agreement for
dividing the leadership by dividing the Iraqi government and KRG’s position. According to this
agreement, KDP supports Talabani to be either the president or the prime minister of Iraq.
Likewise, PUK supports Barzani to be president of Kurdistan by creating the position of
president inside the Kurdistan region.105 Additionally, the agreement stipulated that PUK's
member should hold the speaker of the National Assembly; KDP's member should hold the
prime minister of Kurdistan region; further, all political parties participate in National election
and regional election in one list because as the preamble of the agreement stated that PUK and
KDP’s unification was to protect Kurdish cause inside the federal government of Iraq. 106
Additionally, the agreement stipulated that the voting for Talabani and Barzani must be
corresponding obligation.107
On January 30, 2005 general elections were held at three deferent levels. At the federal
and regional level, both KDP and PUK participated as one list. At the governorate level, PUK
and KDP participate as one list Kirkuk, Mosul, and Diyala’s governorates, 108 but PUK and KDP
participated separately in Sulimanyah, Duhok, and Erbil’s governorates.109 The result of the
election was very close 2005.
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After the election, KDP proposed one package, which was the implementation of a
power-sharing agreement with PUK. This package was quid pro quo to vote for Talabani to be
president of Iraq. In return, the KDP requested the following positions be held by KDP members:
the president of the Kurdistan region, the prime minister of Kurdistan region, the head of security
forces of Erbil, the minister of finance of KRG, the minister of Peshmerga of KRG, the deputy of
Iraqi prime minister, and the minister of foreign affairs of Iraq.110 In offering this package, the
KDP sought to consolidate its power in the KRG instead of focusing on the federal
government.111
The president position of KRG was a controversial issue between KDP and PUK. KDP
is considered the architect of the presidency law of the region, which was presented to PUK’s
politburo on April 18 of 2005.112 Consequently, PUK proposed that the President should be
elected inside parliament consistent with the power-sharing agreement to Talabani position in
Baghdad. Talabani was elected inside parliament. Thus, PUK wanted to elect Barzani inside the
parliament as well. Further, PUK wanted to make consistency between the Talabani mandate in
Baghdad and Barzani mandate in Kurdistan region. Thus, PUK insisted on electing Barzani
inside parliament, not through the popular vote, to create a flexible mandate. PUK, further,
proposed that the power of the president should be equal and horizontal to the parliament,
judiciary and the council of minister.113 However, KDP refused to accept the modified version of
the presidency law from PUK’s politburos.114 Still, KDP insisted that the president should be
directly elected by the people, with a fixed term with the potential for two additional terms. The
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president of Kurdistan region should possess the power of the commander in chief and head of
the National Security Council. 115
Moreover, the KDP argued that the PUK revoked the agreement because KDP had voted
for Talabani to be interim president of Iraq on April 4, 2005, but the PUK did not fulfill the
agreement by supporting Barzani to be president of Kurdistan region.116 Eventually, Barzani and
Talabani reached an agreement on the KDP’s conditions.117 Their agreement was that for the first
term, Barzani should be elected by parliament. After that, their agreement provided the president
would be elected by a direct vote of the people including to all the powers that KDP claimed.118
Consequently, Barzani was elected for his first term through parliament. On June 4, 2005
parliament convened its meeting and in the June 14, 2006 Barzani has been elected as president
of the Kurdistan region. At that time, the Kurdistan region system had shifted to a hybrid
parliamentary which has some elements of semi-presidentialism, even though on the law of KNA
it stated that the system of Kurdistan region is a parliamentary system.119`
The ministries of Peshmerga, Internal, and finance had remained separate and run by
double minister of both PUK and KDP. The unification agreement of 2006 was not different, in
most respects, from the 1992 power-sharing agreement because both provided that if the prime
minister is KDP the deputy prime minister must be PUK. Also, the agreement allowed prime
minister to 2 years in that position. It means that the prime minister of KDP has two years as
prime minister, after which he should resign, and PUK’s Prime ministers should be elected by
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the parliament with having KDP’s deputy prime minister.120 Practically, this mechanism of
sharing power highly implicates on the entire region by creating two zones of administration.
KDP and PUK have created "parallel administration."121 PUK has gained full authority over
Sulimanyah. KDP has extended its power over Erbil and Dohuk. These two zones were
administrated through power-sharing agreements.122 There were two Peshmerga ministries, two
internal ministries, and two financial ministries. This double ministry continued until April 4,
2009.123
After 2009, parallel administration was reshaped in a different form: if the prime minister
was KDP, the power of the prime minister was confined to direct the Erbil and Duhouk’s affairs,
and his deputy limited to direct Sulaimaniyah’s affairs.124 This division of power was also true
to other ministers and their deputies.125 The budget of the region was divided based on these two
zones, not based of the fiscal system of unified government. For example, forty three percent of
the Kurdistan region budget was designated to Sulimanyah. Likewise, fifty seven percent was
designated to Erbil and Duhouk.126 This splitting budget for two coffers continued until
December 21, 2010.127
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1.5 Emerging the political oppositions
Although real political opposition appeared after the 2009 election, 128 the wave of
dissatisfaction and protesting began in 2005.129 The political opposition at the beginning
appeared as civil society and public demonstration as lack of service and criticizing the
corruption that was widespread throughout the region.130 Most of these demonstrations occurred
in PUK’s zone. These demonstrations also appeared in firmly controlled KDP’s zone where the
dissent journalist was killed. These actions triggered considerable protesting and criticizing of
KDP and PUK’s forces by acting unaccountably without respecting human rights.131 These
forces have engaged in torture and detaining the people without charges.132 Sometimes, some
Kurdish authority accused the protestors as foreigner agents or vandals as it happened in Halabja
demonstration.133
Nonetheless, demonstrations and dissatisfaction were not capable of changing the polity
which was dominantly controlled by PUK and KDP because of two reasons: First, PUK and
KDP have prevented the people to participate in these demonstrations and dissatisfaction
movements.134 Second, there was not active political opposition to direct these demonstrations to
specific goals.135 Particularly, KIU (Kurdistan Islamic Union) and KIG (Kurdistan Islamic
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Group) were very vulnerable to direct these demonstration and dissatisfaction moments because
their activity was controlled and limited by PUK and KDP.136
The Goran movement, contrary to KIU and KIG, capitalized on these dissatisfaction
movements by directing them in the 2009 election.137 This directing was the beginning of the
formation of the political opposition. The Goran movement was the reform wing inside PUK. It
separated from the PUK due to its difference over renewing the party structures and its
agenda.138 The Goran movement announces itself as a social movement promoting social justice
and rule of law for the region.139 It criticized both PUK and KDP with nepotism and corruption
in many different fields including public services, public procurements, construction projects,
distributing public land, and abuse of the administrative power.140
In 2009 election, the Goran movement skillfully managed to direct public frustration in
creating real political opposition party inside parliament.141 The landscape of polity had shifted
from bipartite powers to tripartite powers.142 In this election, twenty-four lists contested for 111
seats, although only eleven lists were able to secure seats in the parliament.143 The turnout was
very high, with 78.6% participation according to Independent High Electoral Commission.144
The PUK and KDP participated as one list, winning 57 % of the balloted votes. The Goran
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movement secured 24% of the balloted votes, and the Islamic parties with some other secular
parties gained 12% of the balloted votes.145 Also, the difference in this election from the 2005
election that the president of Kurdistan region was elected by the direct ballot.146 Barzani was
able to gain 69.60% of the voters among 12 candidates.147
Even though the PUK and KDP were capable of securing their strategic agreement and
forming the government by gaining 57% of voters, 148 the political opposition’s parties had a
tremendous impact on the public through their media channel.149 Predominantly, Goran media
were flashing out the corruptions and nepotisms which the government was conducting for the
benefit of PUK and KDP.150 Besides the influences of the media, the Goran with two others, the
Islamic Party - Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) and Kurdistan Islamic Group (KIG), formed the
political opposition coalition.151 In the beginning, the relation among the Goran, KIU, and KIG
was not robust as appeared after February 17 of 2011.
The influence of the political opposition has appeared more robust since February 17 of
2011 and following incidents. At that date, the people of Sulimanyah, inspired by the Arab
spring incidents, to show their solidarity with Egypt and Tunisia demonstrations, 152 gathered in
Sara, the downtown of Sulimanyah city. After ending peaceful demonstration in Sara, dispersed
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demonstrators rallied to Salm Street. They passed by the fourth branch of KDP, and a tension
occurred there that led these dispersed demonstrators to throw stones towards the fourth branch
of KDP.153 KDP’s guards reacted and opened fire on the demonstrators. As a result of this
incident, two protestors were killed, and forty-three were injured in half an hour.154
This incident exacerbated relation between Goran and KDP because KDP pointed the
finger to Goran supporters and vice versa.155 The Goran branch was either burned or plundered
in Erbil city, Dohuk city, Soran district, Bnaslaw district, and the Shaqlawa district during the
plundering and burning process.156 The NRT TV, an independent media channel, was burned by
unknown militia due to the fact NRT was vigorously covering the protestors’ activities.157 KDP
moved its special forces, Zervani forces, with the pretext of protecting the fourth branch of KDP.
Even moving Zervani forces was without the permission of the parliament and the president. 158
After February 17 of 2011, thousands of demonstrator flooded on the street protesting KDP and
PUK of corruption and nepotism. The KDP’s student association shutdown Salahaddin
University for one month by sending students to home in order to prevent the demonstration in
Erbil.159 The mainstream of protesting was about the economic monopolization, freedom of the
speech, and freedom of the press.160 This monopolization has reduced the opportunity of those
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people who do not have support from the KDP and PUK. Overall, 10 demonstrators were killed
and 250 others were injured in these demonstrations.161
By bringing the demonstrators demand to the parliament, the political opposition bloc
gradually represented peoples’ dissatisfaction movements. They become a voice of the
demonstrators in the parliament. Particularly, when the Parliament of Kurdistan was convened
for an emergency session to discuss the recent incidents and demonstrator’s demands, KIU, KIG,
and the Goran movement, in that session, almost requested the same demand, which was
reflecting of demonstrators demands and fundamental reform in the polity, respecting rule of
law, and emphasizing on the government accountability to the parliament and the people.162
Moreover, the Goran movement proposed the motion of dissolving the parliament and
governmental cabinet. In its place, the interim government should be established to unify and
nationalize Peshmerga, security forces (Asaysh, and Counter-Terror forces) because these forces
had been divided between PUK and KDP since 2005 despite the unification of the
government.163 In addition, Goran demanded pre-dated election and the returning of the draft
constitution of the Kurdistan region, which was approved and set forth to referendum by the
parliament in 2009, to the parliament to be modified by consensus of all political powers.164
Additionally, in that emergency session, the Parliament responded to demonstrators and
protestors by approving Resolution No.1 of 2011. This resolution includes two track solutions:
first, the immediate solution to the current crises including criminal investigation on killing
demonstrators, banning military and militant moving from one city to another, providing remedy
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for those who were injured or harmed in property, prohibiting peshmerga to interfere with
internal political issues, and interrogation of the prime minister, minister of peshmerga and
minister of internal for power abuses by government officials and others measures.165
Second, the long-run solution was conceptualized in article 16 by stating all those laws
and statutes that have national and strategic aspect of the public interest should be enacted in the
Parliament with consensus of all political factions.166 This provision was a reflection of
demonstrators’ demanded that the draft constitution should be reviewed in the light of the
modern principle of democracy, and the president of Kurdistan region should be elected inside
parliament instead of direct popular voting. 167 Explicitly, this provision was designed for
reconciliation of the opposition bloc (Goran, KIU, and KIG) and the government bloc (PUK and
KDP) over the draft constitution.
Nonetheless, the demonstrators in Sulimanyah were suppressed cruelly on April 18 of
2011.168 Further, these aforementioned provisions of the resolution were only some immediate
solutions implemented by the government. The long-run solutions were not implemented,
including returning the draft constitution to the parliament.169 Despite these facts, Nechervan
Barzani, KDP’s nominee to be prime minister after Barham Salah,170 tried to pull the political
opposition bloc to participate in the government cabinet.171 The Goran movement refused to take
part in the government cabinet because the promises of PUK and KDP to reform in the political
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system were not being implemented especially the long-run solution including the draft
constitution reconciliation.172
Extending the term of Barzani by the parliament provided new venues for political
opposition to criticize the KDP and PUK and to direct the public’s dissatisfactions.173 Before the
2013 election for the Kurdistan parliament and the presidency of Kurdistan region, the KDP
demanded that PUK extend Barzani’s presidential term for a third term because Barzani already
had served both of his two terms ( 2005 to 2009 and 2009 to 2013). Legally, it is impossible to
reelect himself for the third term.174 The KDP wanted to set the draft constitution to a
referendum because the article 64 of the draft will allows Barzani to reelect himself ,175 or to
reinterpret or amend the law of presidency No. 1 of 2005.176 However, the PUK and KDP
brought the draft of law that allows Barzani to remain on the presidency seat from August, 20,
2013 to August, 20 ,2015 until the consensus would be concluded on the draft constitution
among the political factions of the parliament.177
The political opposition parties considered extending the term of Barzani as the coup
d’état on the people’s right to vote and legitimacy of the political system because, according to
172
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current law of the presidency, the president should be elected by direct popular vote and its
allowed only for two terms.178 The Goran movements’ critique affected the PUK voters in 2013
election because, to some degree, Goran and PUK have the same grassroots mostly in
Sulimanyah governorate.179 Extending Barzani’ presidency’s term by PUK was one factor that
affected PUK’s grassroots to vote for Goran movement.180 The Goran movement has got 24
seats, and it lost one seat comparing to the previous election.181 The KIU gained 10 seats and
increased 4 seats comparing to the previous election. KIG secured 6 seats increased 2 seats
comparing to the previous election. KDP have increased to 38 seats from 30 seats.182 PUK
gained 18 seats decrease 11 seats. Despite the allegation of forgery in the electoral process, 183
the political opposition parties have kept their influences in 2013 elections.
1.6 The consensus government
The 2013 election has altered the political landscape in the Kurdistan region. Notably,
when the Goran movements placed itself as second political player after KDP.184 However, this
shifting was different from other forming government because KDP was no longer capable of
forming the government with PUK due to the fact PUK considerably lost its seats.185 PUK could
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no longer bargain as it was the case in 2009 and 2005.186KDP’s nominated candidate to form a
government was Nechirvan Barzani.187 KDP from the beginning of the negotiating on
government wanted the consensus government by bringing the opposition bloc to get their share
from the government cabinet. The vigorous contest was among the Goran and PUK. Goran
argued that it was entitled to receive government portfolios based on being second powers. The
PUK argued that it had the right to receive the government portfolios based on historical
prerogative.188
All political powers try to adapt to the new reality that the election’s result brought.189 Of
course, the impact of this new reality reflected on the forming government that took eight months
and 28 days to obtain the vote of confidence by the Parliament.190 KIU, KIG, and Groan
movement has participated in government cabinet with the condition of implementing the
fundamental reform in the political system including revising the constitution, changing the
system to parliamentary, and tackling the issue of corruption and nepotism.191 The PUK has
joined the government reluctantly; this reluctancy could associated with the fact that the
government could be formed without the participation of PUK. On the June 18 of 2014 the
consensus government has been established by participating all political powers.192
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This new cabinet has started with two big difficulties. The Kurdistan region’s budget was
held by the federal Iraqi government, 193 and ISIS has controlled several Kurdish towns of
Kurdistan region. These difficulties could postpone the reform packages of political opposition
for a while.194 Apparently in this new composition, the parliament has less experienced the
political tension inside the parliament comparing to the previous parliament. Partially this could
be related to the nature of the consensus government because all the draft of laws before
forwarded to discussion, all heads of factions agrees on them. Then, they will pass it to
parliament for debate and discussion.195 Nevertheless, the political tension over the reform in the
polity and the constitution could emerge while the Barzani’s presidency is getting to elapse.196
This consensus government might not resist the accumulated constitutional problems that might
appear in the future.197
1.7 The draft constitution of Kurdistan region
In the course of history, the draft constitution has been utilized mainly to enhance the
Kurdistan region’s authority against the Iraq government and it has been used as consolidation
the power of PUK and KDP against internal players of KRG. The draft constitution has been
utilized for enhancing and consolidating the powers of the Kurdish cause in Iraq since 1974.198 It
was first initiated by as the proposal for Iraqi central government in 1974 -part of the peace
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agreement.199 In that time, the draft was titled as the Basic Law of the Federal State of
Kurdistan.200 The Iraqi central government, however, drafted and ratified the autonomy law
instead of the Kurdish draft.201
In addition to the draft of 1974, the Kurdistan region has four more drafts. The second
draft was proposed to the Kurdistan national assembly by thirty-three members of KDP and PUK
in 1992.202 However, it was not approved and remained as the draft.203 The third draft of the
constitution including 84 articles was adopted by the National Assembly of Kurdistan region (the
parliament of Kurdistan region) through the resolution 26 of 2002.204 This resolution further
obligated all political parties to bind by this draft as the final draft of the constitution.205 This
draft was written by the committee were consisted of 11 members among judges, university
professors, and lawyers. This committee in their drafting process depended on the draft of
1974.206
In 2005, the Iraqi federal constitution was adopted by the people of Iraq. The new Iraqi
constitution has required the revising of the draft constitution of Kurdistan region in the light of
Iraqi federal constitution. 207 The Kurdistan parliament enacted the resolution no 4 of 2005.208
This resolution stipulated revising the draft of 2002, and the forming the drafting committee to
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revise it.209 The drafting committee was created by resolution No 5 of 2005.210 This committee
mainly was directed by PUK and KDP’ members of the parliament.211 This committee started on
September 6, 2005 to August 22 of 2006.212 They produced the draft of 2006 which consists of
160 articles.213 Also, it can be considered as a fourth draft.
The approving the draft of 2006 and referendum on it were neglected until the end of
2009. 214 While the Goran was emerging as the political opposition, 215 both PUK and KDP were
aware that Goran would be an influential political player in the parliament, and it would create
obstacles to their agenda.216 The parliament extended the legal term of itself by the majority
despite the fact that legally the parliament term was served for four years,217 and its term had
ended since it functioned four years from the date of its first convention.218 The extension was
with the pretext that the parliament did not approve the public budget.219 The parliament term,
for this reason, should be extended in order to approve the public budget.220 This extending was
part of the political game to use the draft constitution as a powerful tool to consolidate KDP and
PUK powers against the other political players apparently since 2009.221
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On June 22, 2009, forty members of the parliament boycotted the parliament’s session as
protesting the drafting process and setting the date of the referendum on it. Mohammed Hakim,
member of KIG’s politburo and member of the parliament, stated, “PUK and KDP will vote for
the draft whether we are with it or not.” Also he added, “Barzani explicitly told us that the
election day of the parliament and referendum on the draft will be the same date.”222 In the one
session of the extended term of the parliament, PUK and KDP brought another draft constitution,
which was different from 2006 draft, and it includes 122 articles. 223Theoretically, this draft
could be considered as a 2009 draft. Kurdistan Parliament approved the draft of 2009 by a
majority of its members during extend period of the parliament.224 This approving process,
nevertheless, has several legal procedural defects. For instance, any statutes or laws must be
scheduled before in the parliament’s agenda in order to establish notice to the members of the
parliament. Otherwise, any statute without a scheduled timetable is considered as void according
to article 54 section 2 and 3 of the parliament by-law. Further, any statute before approving must
have two readings. The first reading should provide the brief introduction of the bill in the
parliament sessions after that it must be sent to specialized committees to study it.225 Second
reading is after period when the specialized committee have concluded the opinion about the bill
and they formatted it as legal provisions.226 Then, the Member of Parliament has prerogative to
discuss all of its content. After discussion, the bills will be ready for voting article by article.227
In addition, there were many claims around the committee of the drafting and the
parliament’s actions related to the draft. There were allegations that the draft committee changed
222
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some part of the draft without knowledge of the other members.228 The Goran movement and
some civil activists argued that the parliament itself after June 4, 2009 had lost it legitimacy.229 It
is not allowed to Parliament to extend its term in order to approve the draft constitution during
this critical time. Some civil activist argued that it is not legitimate to vote on the draft
constitution because the people did not have enough time to read its content and acknowledge its
implications.230 To more illustrate, the draft of 2006 was published and the draft of 2009 was not
published at that time.231
This draft was approved by the statute, which is also set July 25, 2009 as the date of the
referendum on it. 232 The statute stipulated that the draft constitution must be considered
enforceable if the majority of the voters approved it.233 The independent high electoral
commission of Iraq (IHECI), however, refused to conduct a referendum due to logistics and
procedures.234 The after receiving the IHECI’s respond, Kurdistan parliament enacted another
statute to determine the issue of the referendum date. It provides another procedure that the date
of the referendum must be set by coordination of parliament presidium and the council of
ministers.235
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However, the issue of the draft constitution was not put in the referendum. After 2011,
the demonstration of February directed the draft constitution. The resolution 1 of 2011 implicitly
furnished another venue to the draft that should be approved based on the consensus of all
political factions.236 In 2013, Barzani presidency’s coming to the end, the debate over the
referendum on the draft constitution came back again because the article 64 of the draft of
constitution allows Barzani to reelect himself to third and fourth term.237 Abdulrazaq Sharif,
media director of PUK’s politburo, stated that KDP offered PUK three options. These options are
revoking the strategic agreement between KDP and PUK, returning Kurdistan regional
government for PUK’s zone and KDP’s zone, and extending Barzani presidency term.238 The
PUK chose the third option and with KDP passed the statute that is extending Barzani’s term for
two years. While extending presidency term, the political parties should seek on getting
consensus on the draft.239
After 2013 election, all political factions have participated in the forming government.240
Sixty one members of parliament proposed the draft of the statute that determine the process of
creating a new committee to revise the draft constitution of 2009. The draft statute was approved
in April 13 of 2015.241 Approving of the revised draft of the constitution should be based on the
consensus of all political parties. This new committee was formed and consisted of 21 members
to finish revising the draft in the three months. The distribution of 21 seats to political parties
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was based on the Sainte-Laguë method. Thus, KDP received 7 seats. Initially, PUK received 3
seats, but Goran gave up one of its seats for PUK. Thus, PUK’s seats became 4 seats. Goran
received 4 seats after abounding one of its seats to PUK. KIU received 2 seats. KIG received 1
seat.242 Turkmen and Syric minorities received 2 seats. The small political parties which have
one seat in the parliament, they received 1 seat in the committee.243
The overall revised draft of the constitution should be approved by the vote of two-third
of members of the parliament. The draft also should be approved by the majority of voters in
general referendum. Nevertheless, the committee of revising draft should decide on each article
by consensus. Currently, this draft has logged at this stage. Also. There is the likelihood of
escalating political tension when the Kurdistan region is getting close to August 20 of 2015
because the extended Presidency term comes to end. The scenarios of the draft will be an open
question.
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Chapter II:
Introduction:
This chapter begins by elaborating the concept of political accountability. It addresses the
mechanism of accountability and its relations with a form of government. Then, this mechanism
is applied to the form of government in KR under existing structures and draft structures in
relation to the answerability and enforcement phase of political accountability. It addresses the
design defects inherent in the existing system ( a form of government, Kurdistan region Security
Council, the sovereignty of parliament) and its impact on political accountability. It elaborates
on the contextual factors that have an impact on the political will of the Parliament in exerting its
powers including mass party, party discipline, electoral system.
2.1. Political Accountability
The concept of political accountability is a debatable notion in terms of definition and its
content.244 Political accountability, moreover, streams from the theory of “delegated powers” or
the ownerships of authority. This theory has been endorsed in liberal democracies that the people
are sovereigns, and the government gains the legitimacy by having a delegation of authority from
the people. Ultimate ownership of authority lay in the people, and the government should
exercise governmental powers with the name and will of the people. In this context, the people
are principal, and the government is an agent to act on behalf of the principal (people).
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Therefore, the government is accountable for its actions due to the delegated powers relation
between the government and the people.245
Despite different definitions of political accountability, there are many common themes.
Erkkilä explains political accountability as “[t]hose who govern have to answer for their actions
to a wider public either directly, when politically elected or appointed, or indirectly as
subordinates of politically elected bodies. If they fail to do so, they can be substituted in
democratic elections. This constant threat forces the ruling government to respond to the
demands of a constituency, who can thus hold their government to account”246 Likewise, Mulgan
contends that political accountability requires “the account-holder to investigate and scrutinize
the actions of the agent by seeking information and explanations and the right to impose
remedies and sanctions. Conversely, for the accountor, the agent, accountability implies the duty
to inform and explain to the account-holder and to accept remedies and sanctions.”247
Moreover, Schedler conceptualizes political accountability as two phases that are the
common traits among abovementioned definitions. First, the “answerability” phase where the
agent is responsible for responding to the questions and inquiries of the principal and the
principal has the right to pursue and obtain information from the agent in conjunction with
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agent’s justifications. 248 Second, the “enforcement” phase purely implies a carrot and stick
approach. 249 If the answers and justifications of the agent do not convince the principal, the
principal has the right to impose an appropriate punishment to discourage the agents from
inappropriate behavior.250 Further, neointuitionalists not only highlight the significance of
questionings and inquiries about the agent’s actions but they also emphasize the sanction
approach which incentivizes the agent to act appropriately.251 The role of sanctions
(enforcement) is fundamental to hold an agent accountable because revealing misconducts of the
agent without punishment is perceived as “window dressing” and doesn’t confine the behavior of
the agent. 252
However, the rigidity of the sanction (enforcement phase) and its degree vary in the
political context.253 The sanction could be “public exposure” or discharge from public office.254
Sometimes if the violation of the agents is extreme, sanctions may include a trial.255 The degrees
of sanctions are characterized in the following three examples. The motion of censure, which is
exercised by the legislative branch and mainly common in a presidential system, exposes the
government officials to the public’s criticism. It has implications on their reputations.256 It can be
found in Argentina, Burundi, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Namibia.257 The motion of no-confidence
and interpellation, which are mainly widespread in a parliamentary system and semi-presidential
248
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system, could be categorized as dismissal from the public office.258 It can be carried out against a
prime minister or ministers.259 The impeachment is a punishment for president or other public
officials for violation of a constitution.260 For instance, in the United States, impeaching a
President involves conviction from house and trial in the Senate by the Judiciary.261
The accountability concept has been classified for many typologies in a political
context.262 However, this analysis deals with a dominant understanding of accountability that
divided the accountability by horizontal and vertical accountability.263 Horizontal accountability
occurs among the symmetric government branches or government agencies that hold each other
accountable. The “checks and balance” mechanisms among the government branches is a
formula of horizontal accountability which take place among symmetric actors.264 Examples of
symmetric players are the “executive, legislative and judiciary.”265 Moreover, there are
independent agencies in modern democracies which plays a significant role in scrutinizing the
action of other branches of government such as ombudsman and general auditing.”266 The
effectiveness of horizontal accountability depends on cooperation among intrastate institutions in
checking each other’s and having de jure and de facto autonomies.267 Conversely, the vertical
accountability implies asymmetric relationships among the actors. In other words, this
relationship bears unbalanced authority between the accouter (agent) and account-holder
258
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(principal).268 The idea of vertical accountability requires the public to restrain the government
official. The electoral accountability of politicians towards citizens is the form of vertical
accountability.269
Vertical accountability and horizontal accountability are useful criteria to determine the
trait of democracy and its features because accountability concept reflects in “procedural
….definition of democracies.”270 “[C]hecks and balance,” which is apparatus of horizontal
accountability, is invented to protect the democracies from self-interested politicians and
preserving democracies from its perils.271 The election process, which is an apparatus of vertical
accountability, is created to avoid system transformation from democracy to oligarchy.272
Moreover, in those countries which have a "competitive authoritarian regime” or “electoral
autocracies” incumbent regimes tend to reduce vertical and horizontal accountability by
eliminating those institutions that “check political actors”, or by patronizing voters, or by
committing “electoral fraud”, or by extending the term of an incumbent president. In those
regimes, increasing corruption and abuse of human rights are highly correlated with decreasing
horizontal and vertical accountability.273
2.2 The choice of the system and its relations with accountability mechanisms:
The choice of the system, whether it is a parliamentary system, semi-presidential, or
presidential system, has a correlation with means and mechanism of accountability in both
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phases of accountability-answerability and enforcement.274 For instance, the legislatures, for
promoting answerability, possess a range of apparatus including legislature committees,
questioning processes, the ability to scrutinize government appointment.275 Moreover, for
promoting the enforcement phase of accountability, the legislatures possess various apparatus
including “notion of confidence, motion of censure, impeachment, and election/selections of
cabinet ministers”.276
Implementing the apparatus above are associated with the type and the form of
government.277 In order to erase the confusion over the forms of government and its relation with
accountability mechanisms, one can find it useful to apply these mechanisms on the “pure form”
of parliamentarism, presidentialism, and semi-presidentialism.278 Hence, to define each of these
forms of government, it is necessary to analyze in term of conventional trends because not all
forms of government are alike.279 For instance, the parliamentary system, which is widespread in
Commonwealth countries, is different from those in southern Europe.280 Likewise, a presidential
system that is popular in Latin American countries is unlike presidential formula of United
States. 281 It is also true that semi-presidentialism in France is dissimilar from those common in
Eastern Europe.282
In United Kingdom’s parliamentary system, the executive’s existence depends on the
confidence of the legislature. Through the motion of confidence, the legislature ensures the
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accountability of executives towards legislators and voters.283 The system possesses the fusion of
powers in which the executive branch- prime ministers and ministers- is part of the legislative
body.284 The prime minister and ministers are members of the parliament.285 They are
representing their constituencies- vertical accountability to voters via elections- and they are also
accountable to the legislative body- horizontal accountability to legislative via a motion of
confidence.286 The head of state is the ceremonial position. Further, opposition political parties
exert questioning and interpellations to force the cabinet ministers to justify their actions on a
“regular basis” (usually daily).287Moreover, the parliamentary committee is another venue that
political opposition supervises the government actions.288 For example, the committee of public
accounts is always directed and chaired by political oppositions.289 It appears the committee
oversight is not active, but it is related to the political parties’ formations and party discipline
under UK parliamentary system.290
The separation of powers is the main characteristic of United State’s the presidential
system. Both legislatures and president are elected separately, and they have fixed terms. The
president’s survival does not require the confidence of the legislatures. The members of the
executive branch are not a part of the legislative body.291 The daily questioning process as exists
in the parliamentary system does not exist in the presidential system. Further, the upper house
(Senate) scrutinizes the members of the president’s cabinet when the president proposes them to
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be confirmed by the upper house.292 The committee’s investigations tend to be strong under
United States’. Removing the President from the office is possible only through the impeachment
procedure.
In France’s semi-presidential system, both the features of parliamentary and presidential
are harmonized mutually.293 Semi-presidentialism is the system that the president is elected by
direct vote, and the government’s existence depends on the confidence of the legislatures.294 It is
also characterized by the separation of powers. In this system, the president is hardly accountable
to the legislatures and the only way to remove the president is through the impeachment
procedure.295 The prime minister is a head of the government and accountable to the parliament
similar to the way that exists in parliamentary systems. The prime minister and its minister can
be removed in the office collectively by a vote of no-confidence.296
At the enforcement phase of accountability under all these system, the impeachment and
vote of no-confidence create distinctive ex-post accountability of the executive towards
legislatures generally. The vote of no-confidence can be ignited by a “policy controversy” or
“legal transgression” between the government and parliament because under parliamentarism, it
is presumed that the government is the agent of the parliament.297 The vote of no-confidence is a
core element of the parliamentary democracy.298 The vote of no-confidence is not only directly
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applicable to the prime minister but also triggers the collective removal of the government
cabinet.299 The collective accountability of the cabinet rises from the fact that the decisionmaking in the government is collective. Thus, they share the collective responsibility.300 The
government is the agent of the parliament, and the parliament is the agent of the voters. Thus, the
parliament should realize the voters’ demands through governments.301
However, the impeachment cannot be initiated based on “policy differences” because,
under presidentialism and semi-presidentialism, the president is not accountable for policy
implementing of legislatures.302 The president is not the agent of the legislative body.303 The
president is politically and directly responsible to the voters, not the legislatures.304 The president
is not answerable to the legislature on a daily basis.305 Impeachment is confined to crimes or
constitutional violations such as high crimes or treason.306 In other words, the impeachment is
limited to “legal transgressions” of the president. The president’s impeachment does not lead to
the collective removal of the cabinet, but rather it is a legal process directed at the president
individually.307 The legislature in the presidential or semi-presidential systems tries the president
not as the principal but as a “sanctioning actor”.308 The “sanctions actors” does not rely on the
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principle-agent relations in their actions.309 For instance, when the judiciary sanctions the
executive members, the judiciary is not a principal of the executive.310
It is reasonable for the president to have different policies from the legislature and not be
accountable to the legislatures’ policies because the voter support for the presidency is based on
a national election,311 While the elections for the legislature could be based on the national level
or local level. The preference of voters for the legislatures is not necessarily congruent with the
president’s policies because the functions of these two bodies are different. Voters may choose
sets of policies for particulars party policies for the presidency while they choose another party’s
policies for the legislature.312 In other words, the “dual legitimacy” of the president and
legislatures could bring different policies.313 When policies of the legislatures are different from
the president’s policies, this difference may lead to the deadlock that cannot be resolved by the
impeachment.314
2.3 The form of government in Kurdistan region
In KR, government institutions have evolved over time. The National Assembly emerged
as the first institutions (see chapter one). All other institutions are created by the national
assembly (Kurdistan Parliament).315 The constitutional system is substantially affected by
political fluctuations of civil war, two administration periods and strategic agreements.316 The
compromising on the form of government and craving the institution for particular persons or
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particular political party produces many anomalies in the checks and balance procedurehorizontal accountability.317 Sometimes, the institutions have been created to preserves the
status-quo of a dual administrative system among the PUK and KDP.318
The upshot of these negotiations result in producing serious flaws in the accountability
mechanisms and have established institutions outside of the parliament oversight, such as
Kurdistan Region Security Council. It creates a system that is difficult to identify as
parliamentary, presidential or semi-presidential under existing definitions. The system could be
perceived as some hybrid formula of parliamentary. Nevertheless, under the draft constitution,
one can rationally conclude that the system is presidential, not semi- presidential.
In KR, the major political institutions are the Presidency of Kurdistan Region that is
directed by the president and vice president.319 The president is elected by popular vote,320 and
appoints the vice president.321 The president can serve for four years from the date of
elections.322 Under existing structures despite the fact that the president is popularly elected, he
or she can be removed from office by a no-confidence vote.323 Nonetheless, under the draft, the
president can be removed only through impeachment.324 The council of ministers which is
headed by the prime minister consists of 21 ministers.325 The council of ministers receives the
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confidence of parliament by a majority of the quorum.326 The council of ministers can be voted
out by a two-thirds vote of the parliament with the agreement of the President to enact a decree.
Without this consent, the Parliament cannot vote the council of ministers out.327 The parliament
consists of 111 members who are elected using a proportional representation system with a
relatively closed-list.328 The parliament is headed by the presidium that consists of three persons:
a speaker, deputy of the speaker and a secretary of the parliament. 329
To understand implications of constitutional structures which increase the executive
branch and party leader’s ability in mitigating the role of the parliament, one has to look at the
existing constitutional structures and draft structures in designing the accountability mechanism.
In addition, the draft constitution espouses the existing structures with some slight modifications
in three areas “the enforcement level of political accountability, the form of government, and the
sovereignty of the Parliament ”. Nevertheless, the other areas of the answerability phase of
political accountability are quite identical to existing structures. Therefore, there is a need to first
address the current structures. After discussion of the current constitutional arrangement, the
draft constitutions will also be addressed briefly. Further, this section addresses the enforcement
phase and answerability phase of political accountability in the current arrangement and the draft
constitutions.
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2.3.1 Form of government under existing arrangement and draft constitution
Some researchers define the current arrangement of the Kurdish region as semipresidentialism. 330Nevertheless, the problematic point of their analysis is that they focus only on
the electing process of the president and the parliament which are done from a separate
electorate.331 Likewise, they analyze the broad power of the president with direct elections and
the separate election of the parliament.332 Separate electorate for president and parliament is not
sufficient criteria to determine the nature of the system because there are countries where,
despite having presidents that are elected “direct[ly] or quasi-direct[ly],”are considered as
parliamentary, such as Iceland, and Austria.333 This analysis argues that the Kurdistan region
current arrangement is a hybrid parliamentary system which has some elements of semipresidentialism.
Further, Elgie defines the semi-presidential as “the situation where a popularly elected,
fixed-term president exists alongside a prime minister and cabinet who are responsible to a
parliament”. 334 He argues that if the system loses the fixed-term condition of a president or the
responsibility a government to parliament, this system cannot be considered as semipresidential.335 Additionally, Elgie claims that in the system that “the president would appear to
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be responsible to the legislatures… [t]his would violate the fixed-term president requirement and
would mean that the country should not be classed as semi-presidential”.336 In KR, although the
president is elected by direct vote, the Parliament has the capacity to remove the President by
vote non-confidence. In the other words, the survival of President in office depends on the
confidence of three-fourths of the MPs. It means that the president could be removed over policy
controversies between the parliament and president. Therefore, it lost the first conditions of the
fixed-term president. 337 Consequently, KR’s system cannot be characterized as semi-presidential
or presidential system.
Elgie also contends that the responsibility of the government (council of minister and
minister) means that the government needs the legislatures’ confidence to survive. Also, he
excludes the condition that the legislature can pass a vote of confidence, but it cannot exercise
the vote of non-confidence against the government as he called “one-shot game.”338 In Kurdistan
region, although the parliament has the power to pass a vote of no-confidence by two-thirds of
the members of the parliament, the President has discretionary powers over implementation of
the no-confidence vote.339 It means that even if the parliament passes the vote of non-confidence
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to remove the government, the president has the implicit power to refuse by not issuing the
presidential decree to implement the will of the Parliament.340 For instance in South Korea, the
Parliament can recommend the dismissal of the government, but the president retains the
discretionary power whether to accept or to refuse the parliament recommendation.341

Moreover, if one attempts to measure KR’s form of government with different
classifications, he or she finds the Cheibub classification useful with regard to the hybrid
constitutional system. Cheibub outlines presidentialism, parliamentarism, and semipresidentialism based on checks and balance mechanisms by examining the interactions between
“the government, the assembly, and (where they exist) elected presidents.”342 The departure
point is that “whether the government can be removed by the assembly in the course of its
constitutional term in office” by “the vote of confidence” or “failed vote of confidence” or
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dismissal powers by the elected president.343 If a legislature does not have the authority to
remove the government collectively, 344 the system can be identified as a presidential system. If
the legislature exclusively has the power to remove the government collectively, it is the
parliamentary system. Moreover, the system that empower the legislature to remove the
government collectively without removing the elected president while having “considerable
powers” is semi-presidential system.345
According to Cheibub classifications, although the Israeli prime ministers was elected by
a direct vote from 1991 to 2001, the prime minister and his or her cabinet could be removed
through a no-confidence vote by the parliament. Thus, the Israeli form of government is
classified as parliamentary. In Switzerland and Bolivia, 346 the government collectively is elected
by the legislatures, but the government preserves a fixed mandate, and the existence of
government does not depend on the legislature. Therefore, the legislature are disempowered to
remove the government. Cheibub classifies these two countries as presidential systems.347
Further, Cheibub argues that the rigidity of using the vote of confidence does not impact the
classification’s general lines.348 For instance, “the 1996 Ukrainian constitution” stipulated that
the legislature can exercise the vote of no-confidence “only once in each of the two annual
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legislative sessions.”349 Likewise, the Russian constitution stipulated that the Duma must pass a
vote of no-confidence “twice within three months” before the legislatures and government can be
dismissed by the president.350
Returning to Kurdistan Region form of government, using both the Cheibub and Elgie
definitions, the Kurdish system is a hybrid parliamentary which has some elements of semipresidentialism. Both government and president can be removed in the leeway because if the
president refuses a no-confidence vote against the government, the Parliament can remove the
President by a no-confidence vote.351 Once the president is removed from office, the speaker of
the Parliament can exercise the power of the president during 60 days while preparations for a
new election are made.352 The speaker can exercise all the powers of the President in issuing
decrees during that 60 days.353 In other words, although the government is not exclusively
responsible to parliament in a narrow sense, both president and government are politically
accountable to parliament in a broad sense. It means both of them could be altered, and this
opportunity for alteration, which parliament has, cannot be found under presidentialism or semipresidentialism.354 Althought the President is not politically accountable in parliamentary
systems due to his or her marginlized role and counter-signature of prime minister, some

349

Id.
Id at 37.
351
Cheibub argues the rigidity on vote non-confidence should not affect the general lines of his definition. Thus,
according of Cheibub argument, using vote non-confidence by third-fourth in Kurdistan region should not be
construed as to affect the parliamentary model. See CHEIBUB, supra note 296, at 37.
352
Presidency Law No. 1 of 2005
353
Article 15, Presidency Law No.1 of 2005 (Kurdistan Region-Iraq).
354
See CHEIBUB, supra note 296, at 37.
350

56

parliamentary countries allow for the political accountability of presidents such as exist in
Latvia, Isreal, Iceland, Austria, Lithuania.355
Nevertheless, the KR form of government retains some elements of semi-presidential
systems such as the dual executive and shared powers between the president and prime
minister.356 The president exerts veto overs the parliament’s legislating process (which can be
overridden by simple majority), the power of conducting foreign affairs, and national defensebecause the president is commander in chief.357 The president possesses broad powers of
appointing judges, the general attorney, the chancellor of the Kurdistan Region Security Council
(KRSC),358 and affirming and issuing the decree for the governors…etc.359
Concerning the form of government under the draft constitution, although article 1 of
the draft constitution states that the KR is a parliamentary system, this analysis argues that the
draft constitution embraced the presidential system. Under the draft, the president possesses the
fixed-mandate, and the only way to remove the president is impeachment which is different from
existing structures of KR.360 The parliament can only hold a no-confidence vote for the
government, it cannot, however, utilize it against the government without the president’s
approval.361 If one applies the Elige analysis to the KR form of government under the draft
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constitution, the president acquires the fixed-term, but the survival of government does not
depend on the parliament. Therefore, the government no-confidence vote is a “one-shot game” as
in the example of South Korea where the parliament after passing no-confidence to the
government,362 cannot enforce the vote no-confidence without the president’s approval.363 Also
according to the Cheibub classification, the KR form of government under draft is presidential
since the parliament can not remove the government.

2.3.2 Enforcement phase and answerability phase of accountability under existing structures
and draft constitutions
Under existing structures, the mechanism of accountability in both phases of
answerability and enforcement is different to the president and the government. The mechanisms
of accountability against a president do not have the answerability phase although no-confidence
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votes require daily questioning because the vote implies that the president should act as the agent
of the parliament. Yet, the parliament does not have the committee to oversee the president’s
actions in order to make sure to what extent the president’s actions are consistent with the will of
parliament. Further, the Parliament by law did not have the power to allow a member of the
parliament to hold an inquiry on the president’s actions. Presumably, the parliament has only the
three-fourths majority no-confidence vote as a tool of enforcement. Because of the super
majority required to trigger this tool, it is effectively impossible to use.
The enforcement phase against the government and ministers is even more problematic
because voting out the government would entail escalating enforcement processes. For instance,
if the parliament votes out the government by two-thirds and the president does not approve, the
parliament would have to vote the president out by three-fourths. It means that this back and
forth in the procedures tend to incentivize the prime ministers act in a way to ensure the
president supports him or her. Under draft constitution, voting out the prime minister could be
blocked by the president. Presumably, changing the president is difficult in both theoretical
framework of impeachment subject-matter jurisdiction and the process in the draft.364 Even if the
parliament impeaches the president by two-thirds, the trial of the president would be in
constitutional court. The verdict against a president should be passed by supermajority of the
constitutional court.365
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In KR, the legal clauses of answerability with respect to the questioning process and
committee oversight offer the government and ministers more leeway to not provide information
or be accountable to the parliament. For instance, the questioning process is divided by two
categories the written questions and oral questions. If the prime minister or ministers do not
respond to the questions, the member of the parliament can trigger an interrogations process, but
the prime ministers and ministers must consent to interrogations and to appear in the main
chambers.366 Thus, if the prime minister and ministers do not appear in the interrogation
sessions, legislators are powerless to pass a motion for a no-confidence vote. Additionally, the
interrogation of the prime minister focuses on political questions. Consequently, the judiciary
cannot interfere to force the prime ministers and ministers to be present in the main chamber.
In KR, although the committees are gatekeepers of the main chamber in creating policies
and providing oversite of the ministers in respect to their jurisdictions, these committees tend not
functions when the same majority controls the government ministers, parliament presidium, and
the chairman of these committees.367 Consequently, when that majority has strong party
discipline, these committees tend to do no oversight on government actions or their senior
leaders in the executive. Generally, chairing these committees is very important to the political
opposition, but in KR, the same majority that forms the government and constitute the presidium
can deprive opposition from chairing important committees such as the legal committee,368
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finance affairs committee,369 Consequently, depriving these committees form political opposition
creates an inactive parliament.
2.4 Undermining the political accountability of both the council of ministers and parliament
by Kurdistan Region’s Security Council under draft constitutions and existing structures:
Under the draft constitution and existing structure, 370 the Kurdistan Region’s Security
Council possesses overlapping jurisdictions with both legislating role of parliament and
executive role of the council of ministers.371 The Kurdistan Region’s Security Council (KRSC) is
the executive and legislative body which has the broad’s capacity of creating law, regulations,
and executing laws under supervision of the president.372 It has far more flexible jurisdiction
over information security, economics security, foods security, energy security and organized
crimes…etc. This council is a protector of the constitution and laws of the regions.373 The
President supervises this council, and it is headed by the chancellor.374 Moreover, the president is
able to add any members of the government including ministers and prime ministers to order
them under the council formations.375 The permanent members of this council are the director of
the security agency, the director of general department of the military secret services, the
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directors of the intelligence agency (Dazgay Zanyari which is secrete services of PUK) and
protection agency (Azhanci Parastin which is secret services of KDP).376
Furthermore, the Law of Kurdistan Region Security Council (LKRSC) No.4 of 2011
empowers both president and KRSC to exercise broad discretionary powers over determining the
content of above-mentioned jurisdictions and terminologies. LKRSC does not define these
jurisdictions precisely, and it does not specify to what extent it may be applied. For instance,
protecting the constitution and laws of regions under LKRSC may entail interventions in
parliament’s duties or against its ministers. In an extreme case, KRSC may use its broad
discretion to subvert the political system under pretext of protecting the constitution such as a
similar National Security Council did under pretext of protecting constitution and secular system
in Turkey.377 Likewise, the “economic security” could entail corporate regulations, tax
regulations, rules on oil income, and commerce. As long as these terminologies are not defined,
LKRSC could involve very broad implications.378
KRSC can undercut the agency of the parliament and its political accountability to
voters-vertical accountability- because KRSC can substitute the parliament in creating laws and
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policies in above-mentioned jurisdictions.379 Additionally, KRSC is a parallel executive that can
carry out the government duties (council of minister and ministers’ duties) without having to be
accountable or answerable to the parliament -undercutting the horizontal accountability between
executive and parliament. It directly undermines the principal-agent relation and political
accountability between the parliament and executive (council of ministers) under parliamentary
formula.380 KRSC can perform the executive duties of government without being the agent of the
parliament, and the parliament cannot provide oversight of it.381 Furthermore, the president can
utilize the KRSC council to abrogate the power of the council of ministers and its agency which
is, to some degree, answerable to the majority of the parliament in KR.
The KRSC is not compatible with the presidential formula in terms of principal-agent
relations and political accountability.382 Under presidentialism, it is true that the president is not
the agent of the legislature, but the secretaries and civil servants under the president are subject
to oversight of multiple competing principals, namely the lower house and upper house.383
Besides, under the presidential formula, the bureaucrats under the president are not immunized
from judicial review (sanctioning actors),384 but the KRSC is immunized from the court’s review
because legal processing against KRSC requires the president’s consent to waive immunity.385
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This graph is created based on Kaare Strøm Model for political accountability and chain of delegations
between principal and agent under presidential and parliamentary government.
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bill of rights and constitutional court (judicial review to scrutinize the parliament’s action) under
existing structures. This flexibility allows the majority more powers without restraints.
Unfortunately, this majority uses its influence to reduce accountability of government.388 Thus,
under existing structures, the Parliament has been pressured and manipulated to reduce its
control over the executive from 1992-2013.389 As a result, any political deal with the support of
the majority can be transformed to law without any restrictions. In other words, any political deal
despite its content if approved by parliament becomes a “de facto constitution” due to lack of
written constitution.390 This flexibility only exists under current structures, but it does not stop
being an issue under the draft constitution. This is because once the draft is ratified-in general
referendum, the supremacy of constitution is prevailing principle over sovereignty of
parliament.391 Consequently, the draft constitution would constitutionalize the defects of political
accountabilities that were mentioned before.392
The sovereignty of the parliament (supremacy of parliament) is related with the first
moment of creating the Kurdistan national assembly (the parliament). As has been clarified in
the first chapter, the seven political leaders signed the first laws which are the Kurdistan National
Assembly law (KNAL). Then, all the others institutions- council of ministers, the presidency-
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were created and designed by a simple majority of the parliament.393 The first law (KNAL) has
been amended by the simple majority of the parliament several times by same usual procedures
of any other laws.394 All statutes of the parliaments are not entrenched and can be amended by
simple majority. Each parliament’s term possesses the same amount of powers of its
preceders.395 These features can appropriately characterized as parliament sovereignty or
legislative supremacy allowing the legislature to “make or unmake any laws” by the simple
majority of its members.396
Under existing structures, the mechanism of political accountability does not have an
entrenched nature to create, guarantee and preserve the right of political opposition or minority
groups of society’s rights. As the parliament does not have sufficient autonomy or political will,
the party leader’s control of the parliament and the country’s flexible legal structures, in context
of KR, create a real threat that the power of the executive will be expanded and the mechanisms
of accountability will be eroded. The quality of political parties affects the quality of democracy
in KR due to the sovereignty of parliament and flexible structure. Often, this power of
Parliament is manipulated to political ends. For instance, the extension of presidential term limits
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was made by the parliament.397 The Parliament amended the article that include term limit
implicitly by extending it for two years.398 It is also true for the KRSC, by parliament’s decree
some legislating powers were shifted to this council.399 Since the written constitution, bill of
rights and constitutional court do not yet exist, the tamed majority of parliament can be a real
threat to accountability mechanisms in KR.
2.6 The political will of the parliament in exerting its powers:
Although many design defects are explained, the inactivity of the parliament and its
marginalized role in political arena needs more substantial understanding. In KR, the horizontal
accountability does not function, and the parliament cannot check the executives.400 The reasons
of ineffectiveness of the parliament relate to de facto autonomy of the Kurdistan parliament.401
The Kurdistan parliament often is labeled as a rubber stamp parliament which legitimatizes the
political decisions that have been made outside of its chamber.402 The actual political
deliberations and decision-making process are outside of the parliament and located in backdoor
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meetings.403 On the contrary, the political accountability requires “open discussion and debate
about matters of public interest.”404 The political accountability is the process of dialog among
political parties in the public sphere.405 The explaining and justifying of the agent to principal are
dialogical process which cannot be observed in KR between executive (government and
president) and parliament.406
The de facto autonomy or the political will of the parliament, which is undermined by the
political party leaders, is the missing element of horizontal accountability.407 The political party
leaders have ample capacity to influence government functions and parliament decision-making
without holding public positions (Ministers, MPs, chief whips, and head of factions).408 The
party leaders’ hegemony is supported by many factors including but not limited to, client-patron
relationship,409 mass party structures, the party discipline, the electoral design. Relatively
speaking, these factors disincentives the party leaderships from participating in the government
and incentivizes instead them to direct their members through parliament or government
structures. Also, these factors allow party leaders to have ample room to place the responsibility
fir government wrongdoing on other’s shoulders while the major decision have been dictated by
them. It is worthy to observe these factors are interrelated not isolated from each other. To
403
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correlate these aforementioned factors with the parliament weakness is central to decisionmaking and to hold government accountable, the following analysis talks about the
interconnectivity of these factors.
Concerning the client-patron relationships, the parties’ leaders exert considerable
powers by patronizing both parliament and government in KR. Patronizing the executive and
parliament informally and indirectly have eroded the horizontal accountability (checks and
balance).410 The common trend is that ministers and MPs are chosen among close association,
relatives, and family members of the party leadership.411 Consequently, the parliament tends to
not interrogate the government. For instance, since 1992, the parliament has not voted out any
government cabinet or dismissed the ministers despite all the corruptions and wrongdoings in
governmental positions.412 Additionally, the method of forming government and the cabinet
which does not require elections for ministers or prime ministers enables the leadership to bypass
voters to mechanically fill the executive’s positions. On that point in KR, Sardar Aziz argues;
Party leaders never run for seats in parliament. Although the governing system in the
KRG is nominally parliamentarian, neither the ministers nor the prime minister are
members of parliament. Therefore, the Kurdish political elite is not composed of current
MP’s, mostly due to the insignificant role played by parliament within the governing
system in the KRG.413
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Moreover, proportional representation’s relatively closed-list, to some extent, endows the leaders
of political party to fill the parliament’s seats with their patronage networks.414
Generally speaking, the patronage network around the party leaders receives advantages
from implementing policies from ministers and governmental positions.415 To some extent and
relatively speaking, the key decision-making positions in the executive attracts some of these
leaders to participate in government to feed these patronage networks which are sustained by
favoring the members of their network from policies implementations.416 For instance, Massoud
Barzani is the president of KDP and president of KRG. Nechirvan Barzani is the prime minister
of KRG and nephew of president Barzani. Nechirvan Barzani also is the deputy of president
Barzani in KDP.417 Masrour Barzani, son of president Barzani, is chancellor of KRSC- members
of KRD leaderships committee and politburo…etc.418
Correspondingly, it could be argued that inadequacy of accountability mechanisms to
hold these potions responsible is an attractive part of these key executive positions because the
presidential candidate is elected by a majority popular vote.419 Removing the president from
office, nevertheless, requires three-fourths of MPs by vote of no-confidence, and even under the
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draft constitution impeachment requires a two-third vote and a super majority of the
constitutional court. The prime minister receives a vote of confidence by a majority of the
members of the parliament and vote of non-confidence requires two-thirds with the potential for
a presidential veto through decree power. The chancellor of KRSC is not accountable to the
council of ministers, parliament, or the courts because the chancellor is only accountable to the
president under current structures and draft constitution.
Thus, MP’s cannot exercise the horizontal accountability because of undue influence of
this patronized process in KR. Even if the MPs of a particular party dissent from their leadership
in the executive, they cannot vote them out due to the high threshold of enforcement phase of
political accountability which is not congruent with political reality. For example, between 20052013, presumably, the PUK and KDP formed a government by majority. If PUK or KDP wants
to vote the government out, the voting out requires the KDP’s MPs and PUK’s MPs plus a third
partner including Goran and KIU in order to reach the two-third majority. In the other words,
once two political parties create a coalition agreement in KR, they no longer have ultimate power
on their coalitions agreement due to third partner consent. Therefore, it cloud be argued that the
Prime minister or government generally have a tendency to not take parliament into
considerations because of patronizing of MPs and the high threshold on enforcement of political
accountability.
Concerning mass party in KR, Max Weber rationalizes the fear of mass party that leads
to the “bureaucratization” of a political party.420 Ultimately, it would render “political
accountability” and “representations”.421 Hence, Johan Stuart Mill argues that the mass party
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would take autonomy from the MPs. Eventually, it creates the parliament that cannot check the
executive.422 Unfortunately, the mass party in Kurdistan region is predominate theme nowadays.
In addition to patronage process, the mass party endows the party leaderships to direct the
parliament without being involved in public positions and without direct accountability in KR.
In a mass party, the party leadership possesses the extra-parliamentary organizations to
direct its ministers and members of the parliament. Based on the Katz and Mair’s analysis for the
political parties, the KR political parties are mass parties in respect to their formation and
internal organization.423 By scrutinizing the interactions between the political party on the
ground (the members of the party), the political party in central office (politburos and leadership
committee), and the political party in the public office (ministers and MPs),424 one can observe
the strength of the party leadership in ruling parliament and government without direct
involvement in KR. The mass party is defined as party that has a congress or conference in
which the members of the party delegate power to a central office as their agent to hold the party
members in the public office responsible towards the members of the party on the ground.425
The mass party has been a common model in Iraq since mid-twentieth century due to the
impact of the socialist movement on the Middle East generally.426 The mass party was a common
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model to deal with the revolutionary movements because it has the capacity to deal with vast
territories.427 In addition to ideological and political impact of Soviet Union on Kurdistan
generally,428 the hierarchy in mass parties and chain of command needed were compatible
elements with organizing military units into political parties, 429 and helped organize partisan
activities and insurgency activities against the Iraqi regime. Generally, the main Kurdish political
parties did not emerge inside parliament or government institutions, but rather they emerged as a
consequence of Iraqi regime atrocities and repression or some of them emerge outside of
government institution.
Hence, the mass party model organized itself between party member in the central office
and party members on the ground. Some Kurdish political parties have acquired public office
since 1991-emerging autonomy in KR- such as KDP and PUK…Etc. Moreover, there are some
significant political parties that emerged after 1991 such as KIU and Goran movement. It should
be observed that KIU is founded in 1996 and did not participate in the government during the
two administrations period until 2005.430 In 1996-2005, KIU organized itself only between the
party members on the ground and the party members in central office. It did not have members in
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the public office until 2005. It is also true for KIG.431 Goran movement was founded in 2009 ,
and most of their leadership was comprised of PUK members in the politburo and committee
leaderships. Nevertheless, it is a mass party due to the fact that members on the ground vote for
upper levels of the party ranks.432 Also, the central office is regulating the interaction between
the party member in public office and party members on the ground. The decision-making
processes of Goran rests in its central office (Jevati Geshti).433
Generally, the degree of independency of MPs vis-à-vis the party leadership control
varies from one political party to another, but the common feature is that these MPs do not have
the power to make major decision such us revoking the coalition agreement or voting out
government-exerting the enforcement phase of political accountability. There is a margin in
which MPs possess some level of independency, but this margin is not sufficient to restrain the
executive. This marginalizes the role of MPs and affects the reputation of the Parliament towards
public and voters.434
In KR, the parliament exercises its power on the margin of the parties leaderships’
hegemony. Often, the executive members including (president, prime ministers and ministers)
hold meetings with party leaders outside of parliament in closed-door sessions. After approving
the major political decisions or reaching consensus, major political decisions obtain legal formats
via the parliament. The dialogical process of political accountability does not take place between
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prime minister and members of parliament.435 Generally, the public does not have detailed
information about these meetings and decisions unless the content of these meeting is smuggled
to the media. The executive actions with party leaders suggest that the actual decision makers are
party leaders and not parliament.436 Thus, The controlling institution is the central office
(Politburos and leaderships’ committee) which gives strength to the executive not the parliament
because the survival of the executive are related with the extra-parliamentary decision–
makers(the central offices) that can exercise the enforcement phase of accountability.
There are many examples to support the above argument, two come especially to mind.
First, there was discussions about the law of presidency in 2005, many members of the
parliament stated that this law was decided by strategic agreement and the legislators’ duties are
to formalize this agreement in legalist procedures to make this law better.437 A more recent
example is the discussion surrounding extending the presidency and the draft of constitution. The
president of Kurdistan region requested the parliament presidium discuss the draft with the party
leaderships to take their positions.438 Ironically, this process backfired in term of political
accountability and principal and agent relationships because the MPs receives support from
voters to represent their interests in the parliament. The party leaders should discuss their issues
inside parliament in transparent atmosphere. But in KR the Kurdistan parliament presidium is
allowed to discuss the draft with the party leaders outside of the main chamber. The implicit
meaning is that these MPs’ statements inside parliament do not represent the actual political will
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of their party. These examples indicate the trend that the true power to decide on the nation’s fate
resides with the parties’ leadership not the elected representatives of the people.
In KR, the central offices (politburos and committee leaderships) are dominated or
monopolized by strong personalities, insular groups, or families.439 The transition between the
members of the party on the ground and central office reaches deadlock when the members on
the ground no longer have capacity to alter the central office.440 It means even MPs inside their
political party are disempowered to replace the members of central office.441 The central office
with a firm hand holds the democratic cycle inside the political party. For instance, KDP from its
foundations was ruled by Mustafa Barzani. After his death, Massoud Barzani, Son of Mustafa
Barzani, became president of KDP until today. The Barzan tribe has dominated KDP’s
leaderships.442 This is true for the PUK as well. Since its creations the party was led by Jalal
Talabani until his illness which has caused disagreement among the party wings on whom to
nominate for his positions as general secretary. Today, Talabani’s family dominates the PUK’s
leadership despite the political tensions with other wings. In KIG, Ali Bapir has been the leader
of KIG since its foundation. In respect to Goran, Nawshirwan Mustafa is the general organizer of
Goran movement from inception until now.443 The only political party which transitioned from
the founder was in KIU. In the general conference, Salahaddin Bahadin was replaced by the
Mohammed Faraj in a peaceful manner.444
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Concerning Electoral design and party discipline, the electoral design and party
discipline serves to increase or decrease the political accountability of the executive (council of
minister and ministers) towards the parliament.445 The electoral system’s design also creates a
barrier for the members of legislature to oversee government and create an active, independant
parliament.446 In systems where the electoral design is PR-closed-list,447 the political party tends
to have strong discipline over their members in the parliament.448 Then, the strong party
discipline tends to have negative affects on the parliament’s ability to enforce accountability over
government.449 Also, some scholars argue that one national constituency and closed-list PR
encourage the patronage process.450
In addition, the electoral system and party discipline through nomination of candidates
are related because the electoral system affects the way that the party leadership chooses the
candidates.451 Moreover, the electoral system allocates the decision-making process inside
political party in regards to choosing candidates.452 If the nomination of the candidates is for the
national level and the electoral system is PR-closed-list, the party leaderships have more control
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over choosing the candidate.453 The outcome of this design is that the leaderships can enforce
more discipline by reducing the dissenting voice to their leaderships through filling
nominations.454 The increasing discipline overs the members of the parliament tends to
disincentives the members of the parliament from utilizing the enforcement phase of
accountability such as a no-confidence vote.455
In contrast, when the electoral design enhances more local participation associated with
local constituencies, the local grassroots of the party tend to have more control over candidates
nomination rather than party leaderships.456 When the candidate has the local support and
electoral design based on constituencies, the system tends to create the opportunity to the
candidate to support local demands over party leaderships.457 It reduces the party discipline of
the leadership overs the members of the parliaments. It creates incentives to dissent against the
leadership’s policy and can lead to the executive ultimately being voted out of government.458 It
also allows the candidate to legitimatize his or her position by having popular support at the local
base in the face of party leadership.459
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Before discussing political accountability in relation to party discipline, it is useful to
distinguish the party cohesion and party discipline are often muddled by researchers. As Hazan
argues “discipline starts where cohesion falters.”460 Party discipline means that the party’s
leadership possesses “ways and means” to restrain and direct legislators, and legislators have
obedience to follow the leadership directions contrary to their preferences.461 Conversely, Party
cohesiveness means that the legislators of the particular faction work to achieve similar
objectives based on their will and preferences.462 Thus, the cohesiveness is related with
legislators’ preference over certain policies.463
Moreover, when the political party enjoys strong discipline in the parliament, the
members of the parliament refrain themselves from parliamentary investigations and noconfidence votes against their senior leaders in the executive.464 Particularly when criticizing the
party leaders in the executive may cause the members of the parliament to be expelled from the
party line.465 Likewise, it may deprive the members of the parliament from futures career
advancements or reelection opportunity.466 In KR, not only are MPs subject to disciplinary
procedures of their party, but even ordinary members of the party can be subject to disciplinary
punishment if he or she tries to criticize his or her leaderships.467
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The problem of electoral design in Kurdistan region allows strong party discipline which
benefits the party leaders because the electoral system is relatively closed-list proportional
representation and all Kurdistan region is considered as one constituency for all parliamentary
seats.468 The parliament of Kurdistan region consists of 111 seats. A hundred general seats,
which are built on PR-relatively closed list, are allocated for the entire region, and 11 reserved
seats are for the ethnic minorities and has been divided into three categories. The Turkmen have
five reserved seats based on PR-relatively closed list system. Chaldean, Syriac and Assyrian
have five reserved seats based on PR-relatively closed list. Armenian have one reserved seat
based on majority.
Further, relatively closed list is defined as a system in which electors vote for the list is
sufficient to consider the voting ticket as valid.469 The elector’s preference only changes the
orders of the candidates who received the seats. In the other words, the each political party
receives the seats based on the list votes. Then, the distributions of the seats among candidates of
each party are based on the voter’s preferences. Presumably, if one political party receives three
seats but no one votes for their candidates, these three seats are distributed based on the orders of
the list. If the two candidates receive the same preference numbers of voters, the seat is allocated
to the one who has priority in the list order.
Strong party discipline, a centralized electoral system, a patronage network, and a lack
of “intra-party democracy” under KR’s mass parties, erode mechanics of political
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accountability to restrain executive actions or to hold government accountable.470 Ultimately it
reverses the relationships between the executive as agent to a principal and the parliament as
principal to the agent. The available tools to exercise the political accountability against
executive tends to not functions and the executive tends to accumulate powers and to act
unaccountably in the absence of active parliament oversight. The members of the parliament are
reluctant in exercising the accountability mechanism without approval of the central office. They
are more inclined to fulfill the central office’s preferences rather than the voter’s.471 In policymaking, MPs forward central office’s preferences over those of their voters.
In KR, the central office almost always exercises the final words in choosing the
candidates.472 For a candidate to be nominated it needs to be approved by central office. Further,
due to the patronage network that party leaders have built around themselves, these candidacies
tend to create more loyalty and accountability of both executive and parliament to party leaders
generally rather towards voters and public. It is safe to assume the party leaders tend to
participate in those governmental positions since there are few mechanism to uphold accountable
while having substantial powers, or the party leaders do not participate in government in order to
not be accountable at all because they possess substantial powers outside of governmental
institutions via the mass party’s discipline powers and patronage network. Thus, as long as the
true decision-making is outside of parliament and accumulated in extra-parliamentary structure.
The parliament cannot have an effective role inside governmental structures.
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Chapter III
Introduction:
Empowering the Kurdistan parliament requires a design that can at least mitigate those
problems which are discussed under the design defects analysis and contextual factors analysis.
The constitutional design is always about the “trade-off” among diverse factors.473 The strategy
of this redesigning approach focuses on the incentives that design factors and contextual factors
produce (see chapter two). Moreover, proposed design changes should be correspond to the
aforementioned issues of political accountability including the answerability phase and the
enforcement phase. In addition, they should account for contextual factors like the political will
of parliament, the mass party system, the party discipline, the patronage networks, and the
electoral system.
Moreover, this analysis proposes a design that can incentivize the party leaders to
exercises their prerogative inside the parliament not through recruiting their patronage network
to be ministers or members of the parliament. To bring back political deliberations and
transparency, the design seeks to disempower the party leaderships in nomination processes,
reducing the party discipline, reducing their capacity to tenuously control the parliament and
executive, reducing their capacity over their grassroots in order to encourage the party leadership
to take a more active role in public office as head of factions in the parliament or as prime
minister and ministers. The analysis further argues that decreasing the influence of
organizational powers of political parties and their discipline allows the members of the
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parliament to utilize the answerability and enforcement phase of political accountability more
actively.
Further, to overcome the serious flaws of accountability in KR, this analysis claims the
electoral system and form of government could be helpful tools to address the issues mentioned
above. For the electoral design, the single transferable vote could have a vital impact in
minimizing the party discipline and changing the formations of political parties. For the form of
government, the constrained parliamentarism model is useful for reducing many issues
surrounding executive accountability. In addition, these two responses will change the many
various incentives. Finally, there are others considerations that must be dealt with such as the
Kurdistan Region Security Council, and the sovereignty of the parliament.
3.1 Electoral design concerning the party discipline, mass party, and the leadership’s control
To empower the MP’s with independence and to allow the KR’s MPs to express their
will and to be able to exercise the available tools of the answerability and enforcement phase of
political accountability in the parliament, it is important to reduce the party discipline, the control
of leadership and executive hegemony over the parliament.474 From a contextual factors analysis,
enhancing the parliament capacity of government oversight requires the electoral system that can
reduce party discipline, to allow formidable autonomy for MPs, and incentivises them to
represent voters demands over their leadership’s. One has to analyze how the electoral system
can impact on the party discipline and incentivise the MPs.
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The electoral system creates different forms of incentives for the member of the
parliament and the party leaderships. Based on the MPs incentives and party discipline, the
electoral system could be classified for the three types which are “party-centered systems”,
“intermediate systems”, and “candidate-centered systems”.475 In the party-centered system, the
electoral choice does not allow voters to have personal preferences over electing the candidate
inside a list. The party leadership have high discipline over their MPs.476 Also, it discourages the
members of parliament from seeking personal votes beyond the party line.477 In addition, the
party leaderships possesses the high level of sanctioning and discipline over their MPs. For
instance, the closed-list proportional representatiativs are determined by party leaderships and
voters only have one vote for the list, not to the candidates.
Some scholars argued that in closed-list PR the influential principal of the MPs are the
party leaderships not the voters due to the intense centralized process of allocating powers to the
party leaders. 478 Likewise, relatively closed-list is considered as a party-centered system.479
Consequently, this design incentivizes highly regulated, centralized process in which the
candidate is approved and nominated to parliament by leadership.480 Under this party-centered
system, the candidates are encouraged to appeal to leaderships more than the voters and
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grassroots of the party.481 The party leadership has the power to disqualify the member of
parliament from pursuing reelection.
The intermediate system is defined as the electoral system that permits both “individual
and party appeals and sanctions.” In the others words, both the grassroots of the party and the
party leaderships can bar a member of the parliament from reelections. For instance, “single
member simple plurality, alternative vote, and double-ballot” are examples of the intermediate
system. These systems are based on “single member’s district” (SMD) constituencies. The
candidate may utilizes the “party label” to collect votes or it may appeal to constituency to be
more beholden to the constituency’s than the leadership.482 However, if one compares second
intermediate systems with “candidate-centered systems”, he or she can observe that the third
categories is more likely to induce intra-party competition even amongst candidates from a
political party.483
The candidate-centered systems include both “genuinely preferential (open) list and
single transferable vote (STV) systems.” It is worthy to clarify that the genuinely preferential
open list should not have “pre-ordained list” or “default order”. 484 Shugrat defines the open list
as lists that “provided by parties are unranked and preference votes alone determine the order of
election from a party’s list.”485 Yet, political party leaders can screen and disqualify those whom
do not desire to be reelected because in the open-list initially is provided by political party,486 but
the voter’s preference count solely to choose the candidate. To some extent, open-list decrees
481
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party discipline because under the open-list the candidates have two principals: the party
leaderships and the voters.487 Also, it escalates intra-party rivalries which decrease party
discipline.488
However, comparing the PR open-list to STV, STV allows the candidates to be elected
based on voter’s preferences solely by ranking the candidates on the ballot despite the party’s
label.489 STV further reduces the discipline power of party leaders because it retains intra-party
competitions, and it encourages the voters to scrutinize the candidates in close distance because
the voters tend to vote based on the quality of candidates rather than party line.490 STV
encourages the candidate to differentiate themselves from other candidates.491 The electors have
a tendency to vote for the candidates that appeal to him most not only to the party label.492
Hence, the candidate not only has to appeal to the grassroots of his or her party to cultivate votes
but also to seek for the votes beyond their members or party lines.493 Consequently, the
candidates are more prone to create the “personal followers” on the local level.494
In order to reduce the political parties’ discipline in KR, one should decentralize the
candidate’s selections method and to build local constituencies for the MPs based on the STV
due to aforementioned qualities that exist under PR-STV.495 Inducing strong relationships
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between the MPs and the local branch of the political party in the local district is a significant
factor to decrease the party discipline over the MPs.496 Also, it grows the accountability of the
members of the MPs towards its voters rather than party leaderships.497 To further implement a
decentralized design of candidate selection in KR, stipulating period of residency requirement on
the candidates would increase the incentives for candidates to be more accountable to their own
constituencies rather than followers of the party leadership.498 One should avoid creating largesized constituencies and centralized methods of candidate selection in KR because these have a
tendency to strengthen the party leadership and to further weaken the will of the Parliament.499
The nomination of candidates for public office is not only an important factor for
reducing party discipline and leadership’s followers, but it also plays a fundamental role in
reshaping the formation political parties.500 Katz argues “Candidate selection is one of the central
defining functions of a political party in a democracy.”501 Candidate’s selection within
“intraparty politics” could substantially have an impact on the ability of the candidates either by
constraining or empowering the potentiality of the candidates.502 Additionally, Kats discuses
that “whichever extra-parliamentary face were in control in the mass party, selection (and
potential deselection) of candidates would be one of the devices through which control not only
of the parliamentary party, but of its leadership and cabinet members as well, would be
496
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maintained.”503 Under the mass party, candidate selection method allows central office (an extraparliamentary structure) to have considerable impact to influence over elections due to the
hierarchical structures of the mass party at expense of local branches of the party or different
political interest groups.504
In KR, to reduce the party discipline, to decrease the power of the party leadership to
remotely control parliament through mass party structures and PR-relatively closed-list, the
Kurdistan region draft constitution should adopt PR-STV with small local constituencies which
enables the local branch of a political party or local constituencies to nominate their candidates
to the parliament.505 PR-STV permits the independent candidates to acquire seats.506 PR-STV
reduces the powers of the leaderships to recruit their patronage network on the local
constituencies because under PR-STV close evaluations of the candidates by the voters at local
level minimizes the impact of patronage network which is close to leaderships rather than
grassroots of political party.507 Moreover, recruiting the patronage network would not be as
mechanical under PR-STV as it is under PR– relatively closed-list. Further, the members of the
parliament have incentive to be reelected and because the support from constituents matters, they
must build personal support at local level. With regard to the mass party structures and the
powers of the leaderships, John Stuart Mill noted that STV allows MPs to have high
independency from party discipline and party leaderships under Mass party.508
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In KR, redesign of the general seats of parliament should be based on the PR-STV with
local constituencies. Under PR-STV, it is worth noting that the proportionality of seats depends
on the quota and the numbers of seats per constituencies.509 Due to the lack of census in KR,510
this analysis refrains itself from specifically allocating the levels of the seats according to each
governorates and per constituencies. Typically, PR-STV has more proportional and inclusive
outcomes when the number of the seats per constituencies is “five or more” seats.511
Nevertheless, the constituencies should not be too large to undermine the localness and adversely
impact the link between MPs’ and voters. Concerning the women’s quota, a thirty percent
women’s quota under PR-relatively closed-list should be transformed to thirty percent reserved
seats of each constituency. For instance, if one constituencies has ten general seats, three of these
seats should be allocated and reserved to women candidates. Concerning the 11 seats for the
ethnic minorities, this analysis does not address these seats because it requires a more substantial
understanding of party discipline and party formations under ethnic minorities political parties.
Concerning electoral design for disputable areas of article 140 (see chapter one), the
allocation of seats without census may overrepresent the seats numbers than populations of
disputable area in Kurdistan Parliament or vice versa. Nevertheless, the STV formula with a
compulsory ranking vote could minimize the ethnic tension among Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen
because STV incentives these different ethnic to negotiate on the second preference in
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ranking,512 or “even the fifth or sixth preference.” 513 It also drives them to do election
campaigning in different ethnic communities.514 For instance, in order to win votes, the Arab
candidates would seek support from Kurdish communities and vice versa. Also, it is important to
stipulate in the draft a mechanism for adding extra seats from general seats of KR for disputed
areas once they have been resolved through article 140. The suitable mechanism is to allow twothirds of parliament to decide on the addition of extra seats for disputable areas using a
“preclearance process” overseen by the constitutional court of KR under draft because the
power-sharing can be achieved among Kurdish political party by two-third of MPs and the
preclearance could ensure the integrity of adding extra seats and prevent gerrymandering of
constituencies.515
3.2 The form of government and constrained parliamentarism model
The form of government as discussed above, is a fundamental element in determining the
capacity of the parliament to provide oversight of the government because the framework of
accountability within the form of government if it is designed inadequately, allows the flaws and
wrongdoing of executives to go without punishment.516 It also increases the probability those
misbehaviors could be repeated in the future.517 The legislative body in the parliamentary
system is more influential in holding the government accountable because, in the parliamentary
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system, the executive branch is the agent of the parliament.518 The parliament can hold
government based on both political accountability and legal transgression of the executive.519
One of the major important aspects of the parliamentary system is that it possesses the
“immediate” oversight on government’s actions. Moreover, the parliament enjoys high capacity
to dismiss politician from offices.520 Also, the parliamentary system is more equipped to deal
with executive’s abuses of powers and wrongdoings.521
“[C]onstrained parliamentarism” is a suitable design for KR because it means that the
parliament is not able to change the law or to amend the law as it wishes but instead is
constrained by “a written constitution, a bill of rights, and a supreme court.”522 These qualities
correspond with the issues of flexibility and majoritarian rule because a written constitution
prevents party leaders from manipulating the autonomy of the parliament for political ends.
Introducing the bill of rights and Supreme Court enables political and ethnic minorities to protect
themselves from the majority. Under this model, the head of state should possess ceremonial
powers. All actions of the President must be signed by the Prime Minister to ensure the prime
minister is held politically accountable for the actions of President before the parliament.523
Likewise, the president’s actions must be based on the advice of prime minister so that the
president through the prime minister is responsive to the Parliament.524 Therefore, the ceremonial
power of the President, under constrained parliamentarism, permits the president to have only
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accountability on “legal transgression” or “constitutional accountability” not be politically
accountable to Parliament although there are not currently any legal restriction to politically hold
the president accountable.525
To reduce the impact of the patronizing network on the ministers and MPs, the members
of the executive should be elected the same as members of the parliament and by the same rules
of election of the PR-STV with local constituencies. The prime minister and minister should be
MPs at the same time under same chamber because the ministers and prime ministers are
encouraged to attend parliament session in order to pass their government agenda or to vote for
their policies. This will increases political deliberation, questioning, and interrogations between
government members and parliament members and promotes answerability phase of political
accountability. In term of incentives, prime minister or ministers could be removed from office
either by losing elections to their constituencies or dismissing from office by vote no-confidence.
Seemingly, these risks incentivize the prime minister and ministers to act according to the will of
its voters and the public generally.526
At the enforcement phase of political accountability, the executive historically is more
powerful than parliament in KR. Currently under both the draft and current structure, removing
government is by two-thirds vote of MPs. Due to two administrations period and power of
politburo in KR, the executives inherently are more powerful than parliament. It means
executives- outside of government institutions and constitutional power- can accumulate
substantial powers through the mass party and patronizing process.
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Furthermore, parliament seats based on proportional elections always creates coalition
government. No one political party can receive the majority of seats. Thus, it does not create two
strong parties to hold each other accountable- one in opposition and another one in the
government. In the other words, proportionality electoral systems create many political parties
that cannot have a quick response to prime ministers because most of their actions need many
negotiations and other time-consuming processes. Even if one believes that majority electoral
system is suitable for Kurdistan region, the inclusiveness and diversity in Kurdistan region will
be undercut by a majority electoral system. The trade-off should be by lowering the two-thirds
no-confidence vote threshold to a majority of MPs. Thus, one can preserve inclusiveness and
diversity of Kurdistan region in addition to increasing the availability of the enforcement phase
for enforcing political accountability.
Concerning committee design, party discipline, and majoritarian impact on the
committees of parliament, it is important to reduce the party discipline, patronage process, and
majority impact on the committee’s oversight and formalizing policies.In KR, the presidium of
parliament exerts discretionary powers on deciding on the chairmen of committees. Since the
same majority, an incumbent party, controls the government by virtue of its size, it inhabits
chairmen of the committees and Presidium of parliament. Because these committees lack of
separation of purposes- a Madisonian dilemma under federalist no. 10-,527 or lack incentive to
check the government, the curial committees tend to not scrutinize the incumbent party’s actions.
There are different designs to mitigate issues mentioned above. Allocating chairmanships of
financial affairs to political oppositions or a minority political party tends to create active
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oversight of parliament over government spending. This formula exists in the Commonwealth
Westminster model. Legal committees and other committees should be chair based on a rotation
among the political parties in the parliament. In Brazil, all committees are chaired based on
rotation among political parties including political oppositions to reduce the impact of incumbent
party on the parliament checks.528
Concerning the Kurdistan Region Security Council (KRSC), the solutions of this parallel
executive should be eliminated as it undermines both political accountability of the parliament
and government. The KRSC should be an advisory board to “advise and assist” the head of the
executive.529 In a presidential system, the president is also head of the executive. Therefore, the
National Security Council is under supervisions of the president to formulate policies for
president. Hence, it should not have any legislating powers that undermine parliament
accountability to voters. Under the parliamentary formula, the National Security Council is
advisory board for the prime minister. For instance, National Security Councils in United
Kingdom, Israel, India and Japan are under the supervision of the prime minister who is
responsible to Parliament.530
3.3 Overall conclusion
In KR, the unaccountability of the executive and the powerlessness of the parliament to
check the executive are discussed under two track of problems. First, the design defects
including, a form of government, the sovereignty of parliament, the impact of Kurdistan Region
528
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Security Council, inadequacy in the mechanism of political accountability at enforcement and
answerability level. Second contextual factors including, impact of mass party, strong party
discipline, electoral design, patronizing the parliament, lack of intra-party democracy cedes still
more power to the executive leaders and those political leaders whom are outside of executive
and parliament.
The design defect is mitigated by “constrained-parliamentarism” by stipulating bill of
right, written constitution, Supreme Court. Additionally, selecting the executive body to MPs
enhances the interaction between parliament and executive. Also, it provides incentives for
executives to appear in parliament to collect vote and pass government’s policies. It increases
debate and political deliberations between executive and parliament which is a missing element
in KR. By stipulating rotation or fixed-chairmanships of parliament committees for political
oppositions, the parliament can exert more active checks on executive in oversighting and
scrutinizing government policies. The parliament can have more influence over the KRSC
because it would be attached with head of the executive who is prime minister.
The PR-STV with local constituencies further reduces the power of those leaders inside
executive or outside of executive to inhabit the parliament seats. By lowering both the noconfidence vote threshold and party discipline, the parliament can possess more autonomy to
vote out government. This strengthens the enforcement phase of political accountability. The
patronizing members of parliament and mass party structures would be reduced because they are
accountable to their local constituency. The MPs are more prone to fulfill the voter’s demands
rather the leadership in order to preserve their seats in parliament. Moreover, the minister and
prime minister, to ensure their positions, have to participate in elections and face electors rather
than being mechanically appointed as they are under the current structures and draft constitution.
95

Thus, it increases interaction between the executive and voters- which increases vertical
accountability.
By weakening the extra-parliamentary structures of political parties through PR-STV, the
leadership’s apparatus at their hand would be weakened. The parliament structures would be the
center of political deliberations. Intra-party democracy would be increased due to the pressures
of local consistencies. Cohesiveness tends to be the way of functions in the parliamentary
factions. The leaderships encouraged to use more parliamentary techniques to promote the unity.
Likewise, the leadership is encouraged to attract approval from their members in order to be
build loyalty and cohesiveness. The members of the parliament are encouraged to raise critical
issues over their leaderships in the executive-horizontal accountability. Also, the newcomers and
independent candidates would be encouraged to be elected thus helping to protect minority rights
and undermining large party hegemony.
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